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"The mere statement of the case makes my blood boil." 
So wrote Weymouth Kirkland to his most illustrious client, Col. 
Robert R. McCormick of The Chicago Tribune ("Tribune") on Sept. 14, 
1928.1 The prominent Chicago attorney was writing about a case then 
styled State ex rei. Olson v. Guiljord,2 but which would make history as 
Near v. Minnesota3 when it reached its conclusion in the United States 
• Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., University of Maryland 
School of Law; Ph.D. Candidate, Philip Merrill College of Journalism, University of 
Maryland College Park. The author would like to thank Eric Gillespie, Director, Colonel 
Robert R. McCormick Research Center, Wheaton, Ill., for his generous assistance in making 
the Tribune Archives so accessible. 
\. Letter from Weymouth Kirkland, Partner, Kirkland, Fleming, Green & Martin, 
Chicago, to Col. Robert R. McCormick, Publisher, The Chicago Tribune (Sept. 14, 1928) 
(on file with Series 1-60, Business Correspondence, 1927-1955, Tribune Archives at 
Cantigny, Wheaton, Ill. [hereinafter Tribune Archives]). 
2. 219 N.W. 770 (Minn. 1928). 
3. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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Supreme Court nearly three years later. Both McCormick and Kirkland 
were to become principal players in Near, and together they created a role 
for the institutional press as "strategic litigator," shaping the First 
Amendment doctrine under which journalists operate. 
Today, media corporations and their professional and trade 
associations, along with organizations like Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press and the American Civil Liberties Union, carefully 
monitor litigation that implicates First Amendment values and decide 
whether, when, and how to intervene. It was not always so. 
To be sure, such groups as the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association ("ANPA") (now the Newspaper Association of America) and, 
to a lesser extent, the American Society of Newspaper Editors, had 
routinely lobbied and litigated on behalf of their members' business 
interests: antitrust regulation, copyright protection, postal rates, taxes, and 
similar matters.4 But litigation by an institutional press to avoid or create 
doctrinal precedent under the First Amendment really began with the 
appointment of Col. Robert R. McCormick to head the ANP A's Committee 
on Freedom of the Press in the spring of 1928 and his involvement in Near 
v. Minnesota beginning that fall. 
In my previous work on this subject, I have shown that the 
institutional press has been relatively successful in shaping First 
Amendment doctrine, at least with respect to content regulation, through 
litigation in the United States Supreme Court.s In this Article, I 
demonstrate that, although incorporation of First Amendment values 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made this 
kind of litigation possible, the press was nevertheless reluctant to become 
involved. Through extensive use of Col. McCormick's correspondence and 
the Tribune's coverage, I show that McCormick's personal and financial 
commitment to press freedom in general, and the Near case in particular, 
ultimately persuaded the institutional press to pursue doctrinal litigation in 
their own interest. 
Part I briefly outlines the background of the Near case, while Part II 
discusses the role of incorporation in making a First Amendment challenge 
feasible. Part III traces McCormick's efforts to draw the institutional press 
into the Near litigation. Part IV covers the proceedings before the Supreme 
Court, while Part V describes the landmark opinion itself. Finally, Part VI 
4. See EDWIN EMERY, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS 
ASSOCIATION (1950); PAUL ALFRED PRA TIE, GoDS WITHIN THE MACHINE: A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, 1923-1993 (1995). 
5. Eric B. Easton, The Press as an Interest Group: Mainstream Media in the United 
States Supreme Court, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 247 (2007). 
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discusses the aftennath of Near v. Minnesota and the mobilization of the 
institutional press. 
I. NEAR v. MINNESOTA: BACKGROUND 
The story of Near v. Minnesota begins, not with Jay Near and Howard 
Guilford, Near's partner in sleaze, but with John L. Morrison, a highly 
religious, crusading prude with a venomous pen who waged a one-man 
crusade against the purveyors of booze and prostitutes in the wild and 
wooly iron mining town of Duluth, Minnesota, in the mid-1920s.6 
Morrison's muck-raking newspaper, the Duluth Rip-saw, also went 
after the politicians who protected Duluth's rather crude entertainment 
industry. They were not amused and took their pique to the state 
legislature. In 1925, the Minnesota legislature-with some drafting help by 
Minneapolis newspapers, no less 7 --enacted a Public Nuisance Law, or 
"gag" law, that provided for abatement as a public nuisance of any 
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other 
periodical. ,,8 
6. FRED W. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE LANDMARK 
SUPREME COURT CASE THAT GAVE NEW MEANING TO FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 3-28 (1981). 
Fred Friendly was always a great story teller, and his love of the Constitution and its First 
Amendment made him the perfect author to capture this story. McCormick's biographer 
calls it "the definitive history" of this episode. RICHARD NORTON SMITH, THE COLONEL: THE 
LIFE AND LEGEND OF ROBERT R. MCCORMICK 1880-1955, at 280 (1997). It is certainly more 
definitive than "the Colonel's" own version, which makes Near and Guilford seem like 
candidates for sainthood. See ROBERT R. MCCORMICK, THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 46-52 
(Amo Press 1970) (1936), PHILIP KINSLEY, LIBERTY AND THE PRESS: A HISTORY OF THE 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S FIGHT TO PRESERVE A FREE PRESS FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (The 
Chicago Tribune 1944). 
7. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 21. 
8. Jd. at 22. Section 1 ofthe Act provided: 
Section I. Any person who, as an individual, or as a member or employee of a 
firm, or association or organization, or as an officer, director, member or 
employee of a corporation, shall be engaged in the business of regularly or 
customarily producing, publishing or circulating, having in possession, selling or 
giving away. 
(a) an obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, 
or 
(b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other 
periodical, 
-is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be enjoined, 
as hereinafter provided. 
Participation in such business shall constitute a commission of such nuisance 
and render the participant liable and subject to the proceedings, orders and 
judgments provided for in this Act. Ownership, in whole or in part, directly or 
indirectly, of any such periodical, or of any stock or interest in any corporation or 
organization which owns the same in whole or in part, or which publishes the 
same, shall constitute such participation. 
In actions brought under (b) above, there shall be available the defense that the 
truth was published with good motives and for justifiable ends and in such actions 
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University of Minnesota historian Paul L. Murphy attributes 
enactment of the gag law to "public exasperation" with the yellow 
journalism of the time and the "emergence of a number of cheap, 
ephemeral scandal sheets, which were used for extortion, blackmailing 
petty crooks, or pressuring concessions from venal public officials." 9 
Murphy points out that "Minnesota's experiment quickly drew warm 
national approval" as a practical alternative to administrative censorship, 
which would have been too costly, or civil or criminal libel actions, which 
had proved ineffective. 10 
Although Murphy does not discuss the importance of the Rip-saw to 
its adoption, a target of that paper, then-State Sen. Michael J. Boylan, came 
to be known as the "father" of the gag law. 11 In any event, Publisher 
Morrison died of a blood clot in the brain before he could be prosecuted 
under it. Of course, there was no shortage of scandalous newspapers in that 
era;12 Near and Guilford were ready targets down in Minneapolis. 13 Near 
was not nearly as self-righteous (or righteous at all, for that matter) as 
Morrison but was a complete scoundrel and bigot: antisemitic, antiblack, 
antilabor,14 and unfailingly hostile to Minneapolis area officials. 
In 1927, Near and Guilford launched The Saturday Press, a scurrilous 
rag that, among other things, alleged that Jewish gangsters were 
the plaintiff shall not have the right to report (sic) to issues or editions of 
periodicals taking place more than three months before the commencement of the 
action. 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702 (1931). 
9. Paul L. Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historical Developments, 66 
MINN. L. REv. 95, 135-36 (1980). Murphy notes without comment that the legislative 
history of the act is described in John E. Hartmann, The Minnesota Gag Law and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 37 MINN. HIST. 161, 162 (1960). Hartmann, then a graduate 
student, acknowledges the "claim" that the act was directed against a particular editor but 
fmds no substance in the legislative history pointing one way or the other. Introduced by a 
Progressive-Republican from Minneapolis, the bill was apparently handled routinely, 
enacted without dissent, and signed by the governor without any fanfare with other end-of-
session bills. Id. at 161. 
10. Murphy, supra note 9, at 137. Of that so-called "efficiency," McCormick writes, 
"The statute was cunningly devised not only to avoid the necessity of indictment by the 
grand jury, as had been done in the Zenger case, but to avoid a jury trial also and leave the 
newspaper at the mercy of a corrupt or politically controlled court." MCCORMICK, supra 
note 6, at 46. McCormick is referring to the near-mythic case of John Peter Zenger, a 
colonial printer prosecuted for seditious libel and acquitted through jury nullification. See 
JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRiAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 
(Belknap Press 1963) (1736). 
11. Newspaper 'Gag'Law is Assailed as 'Dangerous,' CHI. TRiB., Mar. 26,1929, at 17. 
12. Indeed, it seems they have been with us always. See, e.g., Ralph Frasca, The 
Helderberg Advocate: A Public-Nuisance Prosecution a Century before Near v. Minnesota, 
26 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215 (2001). 
13 . FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 31. 
14. Id. at 32. 
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responsible for bootlegging, gambling, and racketeering in Minneapolis 
(which probably didn't bother anyone), and that certain law enforcement 
officials-especially Hennepin County Prosecutor Floyd B. Olson-were 
letting the gangsters run amok (which certainly did).15 
Olson undertook to put Near out of business and filed a complaint on 
November 21, 1927, alleging multiple instances of defamation.16 
Describing the newspaper as "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory," the 
"magic words" of the Public Nuisance Law, Olson sought an injunction 
under that act.17 A temporary restraining order was issued the same day, 
enjoining Near and Guilford from publishing The Saturday Press or 
anything like it. IS The Saturday Press never recovered, but that TRO, 
which lasted more than a year,19 became the predicate for the most 
important press freedom case in American history up to that date. 
At first, Near was represented only by local counsel, Thomas Latimer, 
a prominent Minneapolis attorney and, in Fred Friendly's words, a "self-
appointed Legal Aid Society.,,20 When Near finally got to court in 
December 1927, Latimer argued that the Public Nuisance Law was a 
"subterfuge" to avoid the state constitution and the requirements of its libel 
law?1 Although he compared it to laws in fascist Italy and communist 
Russia, his argument fell on deaf ears. Judge Mathias Baldwin, who had 
himself been a target of The Saturday Press, refused to lift the restraining 
order but did certify the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court.22 
On May 25, 1928, the Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously upheld 
the validity of the statute as an exercise of the state's police powers.23 "A 
15. ld. at 45-49. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 47. McCormick's "spin" on 
Olson's decision to invoke the gag law is that "he would not risk" a libel action, implying 
that Near was telling the truth. 
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 47; FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 50. Friendly called the 
filing a "complaint," as does Hughes, but McCormick characterizes it as an "information," 
the kind of charging document used in the Zenger case to which McCormick had referred 
earlier. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 704 (1931). 
17. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 50. 
18. ld 
19. ld. at 53. But see MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 47. The timeline here is somewhat 
unclear. Friendly says the TRO remained in force for twenty-six months but dates the 
permanent injunction at three months after an October 10, 1928, hearing. That would make 
the duration of the TRO only fourteen months. McCormick dates the permanent injunction 
on October 11, 1928, which may refer to an oral judgment that Friendly says was conveyed 
to the lawyers. None ofthe briefs or opinions provide clarification except by reference to the 
record extract. 
20. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 5l. 
21. Jd. at 51-52. 
22. Id at 53. 
23. State ex reI. Olson v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770 (Minn. 1928). Elsie Latimer is also 
listed as counsel for Near. 
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business that depends largely for its success upon malice, scandal and 
defamation can be of no real service to society," wrote Chief Justice 
Samuel Bailey Wilson for a unanimous court. "It is not a violation of the 
liberty of the press or of the freedom of speech for the Legislature to 
provide a remedy for their abuse.,,24 Four and a half months later, Judge 
Baldwin made the temporary restraining order a permanent injunction/5 
prohibiting Near and Guilford from publishing until they agreed to publish 
only the truth, "with good motives and for justifiable ends.,,26 
As outrageous as the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion might seem 
today, the journalism of the day may have been even more outrageous. 
Murphy points out that, ''with the rise of the tabloid, 1920's journalism 
offended many older, more serious Americans, who were still guided by a 
vigorous Victorian-Progressive morality and decorum.'.27 Indeed, "[t]he 
national student debate topic for 1930 was: Resolved: That the Minnesota 
Nuisance Law should be adopted by every state in the Union.',28 
By then, however, word of the case had reached New York and the 
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), which had been formed in 
1920.29 Although the ACLU announced that it would take the case to the 
United States Supreme Court, there were doubts about the group's financial 
wherewithal, and its involvement in the case was ultimately minimal.30 
Word also reached Chicago and Col. McCormick, who sent the case file on 
to Weymouth Kirkland. 
II. INCORPORATION: THE NECESSARY PRECONDITION 
Before turning to Kirkland's response, and McCormick's decision to 
take charge of the case and use it to establish modern prior restraint 
doctrine, we must remember that less than a decade earlier, such litigation 
would not have been possible. Until incorporation, usually attributed to 
Gil/OW v. New YorK' in 1925, the First Amendment could not be invoked 
against state gag laws; only Congress was precluded from abridging 
freedom of the press under the federal Constitution.32 
24. Id. at 773. 
25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
26. 1925 Minn. Laws 358 § 1, supra note 8. 
27. Murphy, supra note 9, at 134. 
28. Id. at 137 (citing LAMAR T. BEMAN, CENSORSIDP OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS 178 
(1930». See also SILAS BENT, BALLYHOO: THE VOICE OF THE PRESS (1927). 
29. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 63. 
30. Id. at 63-65. McCormick's version of the tale, at least in its published version, 
avoids any mention of the gangsters' religious affiliation or Near's anti-Semitism. 
MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 45-52. 
31. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Madison's proposed draft of the First Amendment had not been so 
constrained on that point: "The people shall not be deprived or abridged of 
their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom 
of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.,,33 
That language appears to have passed in the House, but the Senate changed 
the subject of the sentence to "Congress." Paul Starr points out, however, 
that without a record of the discussion, there is no way to know whether the 
change was meant to be substantive.34 
Madison had even proposed another amendment explicitly prohibiting 
the states from abridging freedom of speech. "[I]f there was any reason to 
restrain the government of the United States from infringing upon these 
essential rights, it was equally necessary they should be secured against the 
state govemments.,,35 That, too, passed the House, but not the Senate. As 
adopted, the First Amendment protected freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press from encroachment only by the new national government.36 
Other provisions of the Bill of Rights were not so clearly drawn; the 
"takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment, for example, never mentions 
Congress. Using the passive voice, it says only, "nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.,,3? So when a Baltimore 
wharf owner sued the city for destroying the value of his property, he not 
unreasonably claimed just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.38 But 
when Barron v. Baltimore reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1833, Chief 
Justice Marshall found the question presented "of great importance, but not 
of much difficulty." 
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the 
United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the 
government of the individual states. Each state established a 
constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided such 
limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government 
as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a 
government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to 
their situation, and best calculated to promote their interests. The 
powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by 
itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are 
33. PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS 74 (2004). 
34. Id. at 75. 
35. Id. Had the amendment passed, it would have been the fourteenth amendment in the 
original House resolution. 
36. For the time being, we can leave aside the question as to whether this "freedom" 
was a right or a privilege (if those are different), or neither of those, but merely an immunity 
from Congressional action. 
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
38. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1832). 
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naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government 
created by the instrument. ... 
If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be 
understood as restrainin~ the power of the general government, not as 
applicable to the states.3 
Marshall reinforced the logical argument with a reference to the 
prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws imposed on 
Congress in Article I, Section 9 and expressly imposed on the states in 
Section 10. 
If the original constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the first 
article, draws this plain and marked line of discrimination between the 
limitations it imposes on the powers of the general government, and on 
those of the states; ifin every inhibition intended to act on state power, 
words are employed which directly express that intent; some strong 
reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious 
course in framing the amendments, before that departure can be 
assumed. 
We search in vain for that reason.40 
Finally, Marshall turned to constitutional history. It was "universally 
understood," he said, that the constitution was not ratified without 
"immense opposition.'.41 He noted that nearly every ratifying convention 
recommended amendments against abuse of power, against 
"encroachments of the general government-not against those of the local 
governments. " 
In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears 
thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the 
required majority in congress, and adopted by the states. These 
amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply 
them to the state governments. This court cannot so apply them.42 
Although some constitutional thinkers, particularly more radical 
abolitionists, would express the view that states were nevertheless required 
to guarantee some or all of the rights enumerated in the first eight 
amendments, particularly freedom of speech and of the press, they justified 
their arguments on grounds other than direct application of the 
amendments.43 Barron v. Baltimore was never seriously challenged.44 
Thus, even had the press been ready to emerge as a strategic litigator 
in its own interest-which it decidedly was not-it would have had no First 
39. Id. at 247. 
40. Id. at 249. 
41. Id. at 250. 
42. Id. 
43. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE" 266-
70, 366-67 (2000). 
44. Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 
A Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140, 141 (1949-50). 
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Amendment shield against most of the regulations to which it was 
susceptible. Between the expiration of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 
and the Civil War, the most onerous of these would have been the laws 
enacted by slaveholding states criminalizing the expression of abolitionist 
views, as well as unsuccessful attempts to enact similar statutes in the 
North.45 The extent to which the Republican reaction against those laws 
influenced the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment after the war is a 
matter of considerable debate. 
With the First Amendment now securely incorporated, it is easy 
enough to look back on that debate as a historical curiosity with little 
practical relevance today. Still, no understanding of incorporation can be 
complete without appreciating why that constitutional "work-around" was 
necessary. At the very least, it may explain why the Supreme Court seems 
to have incorporated the First Amendment so casually, without the detailed 
explication one would expect to accompany such an important shift in 
constitutional doctrine. 
Was the Fourteenth Amendment designed by its framers and 
understood by its ratifiers to enable the national government to enforce the 
rights enumerated in the first eight amendments against the states through 
the privileges or immunities c1ause?46 The leading advocate for the 
affirmative position was Justice Hugo Black: 
My study of the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the expressions of those who sponsored and favored, 
as well as those who opposed its submission and passage, persuades 
me that one of the chief objects that the provisions of the 
Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended 
to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states. 
With full knowledge of the import of the Barron decision, the framers 
and backers of the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to 
be to overturn the constitutional rule that case had announced. This 
historical purpose has never received full consideration or exposition 
in any opinion of this Court interpreting the Amendment.47 
In his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, Justice Black 
proffered a scathing indictment of the failure of the Court in the Slaughter-
45. Curtis quotes a North Carolina statute making it a crime to circulate "any written or 
printed pamphlet or paper ... the evident tendency whereof is to cause slaves to become 
discontented with the bondage in which they are held ... and free negroes to be dissatisfied 
with their social condition." CURTIS, supra note 43, at 293. See also AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERlCA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 371-72 (2005). 
46. This was the view of Rep. John A. Bingham (R-Ohio), principal drafter of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. CURTIS, supra note 43, at 360. 
47. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting) (holding 
that the due process clause did not protect a criminal defendant's right against self-
incrimination in state trials). 
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House cases48 and their progeny to consider the legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Slaughter-House, the first cases on point to 
reach the Supreme Court after ratification, the Court effectively made a 
constitutional nullity of the privileges or immunities clause. A 
contemporary historian restates that view more emphatically with respect to 
the First Amendment. 
Justice Miller [who wrote the majority opinion in Slaughter-House] 
leaves out the entire history of suppression of civil liberties of white 
opponents of slavery, including Republicans, in the South before the 
Civil War. He is silent about the suppression of free speech in the 
South for Republicans as well as abolitionist. ... He fails to note that 
Black Codes abridged privileges including free speech . . . . The 
struggles for free speech about slavery before the Civil War show that 
Justice Miller's constricted reading of the privileges-or-immunities of 
citizens of the United States secured by the Fourteenth Amendment 
. I . k 49 was senous y mlsta en. 
On the other side of the issue, writing two years after Justice Black's 
Adamson dissent, Stanley Morrison called Black's position "fatally weak" 
and based on flawed historical research.50 "In the absence of any adequate 
support for the incorporation theory, the effort of the dissenting judges in 
Adamson v. California to read the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth 
Amendment amounts simply to an effort to put into the Constitution what 
the framers failed to put there.,,51 Morrison's position is supported by his 
Stanford colleague Charles Fairman in a companion article laying out a 
detailed legislative history of the Amendment. 52 
There is no need to resolve this debate here, even if that were 
possible, but even Morrison suggests that Black and his fellow dissenters in 
Adamson may have been logically correct with respect to the First 
Amendment. "Once the basic principle of substantive due process had been 
established, there was no reason why liberty of speech and religion should 
not be protected by that doctrine against arbitrary legislation, just as 
economic liberty was protected.,,53 Still, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., famously said, "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
48. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). A year earlier, a federal circuit court had 
held that the First Amendment guarantee of free speech applied to the states through the 
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that view went nowhere. 
United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871). 
49. CURTIS, supra note 43, at 375-76. Curtis also cites with approval Richard L. Aynes, 
Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 627 (1994). 
50. Morrison, supra note 44, at 171. 
51. Id.atI73. 
52. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949-50). 
53. Morrison, supra note 44, at 168. 
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experience. ,,54 And it would be more than a half century after ratification 
before the Supreme Court would apply the Fourteenth Amendment to strike 
down a state law censoring the press. 
In the relevant cases that followed Slaughter-House, the Court 
consistently rejected any contention that specific rights enumerated in the 
first eight amendments could be enforced against contrary state law.55 The 
"first intimation from any justice of the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth 
Amendment might be considered to incorporate the Bill of Rights,,56 came 
in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont,57 an 1892 cruel 
and unusual punishment case: 
[S]ince the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, no one of the 
fundamental rights of life, liberty or property, recognized and 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, can be denied or 
abridged by a State in respect to any person within its jurisdiction. 
These rights are'sWrincipally, enumerated in the earlier Amendments of 
the Constitution. 
Five years later, Harlan wrote a majority opinion stating in dicta that 
due process required just compensation in a state takings case, although 
Morrison calls Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago59 a 
substantive due process case, rather than an incorporation case.60 The 
incorporation argument was rejected again in 190061 and 1908.62 
54. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881). 
55. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875) (civil jury trial); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (First and Second Amendments); Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516 (1884) (indictment by grand jury); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) 
(right to bear arms); Speis v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887) (right to impartial jury; resolved 
on other grounds); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (cruel and unusual punishment); 
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891) (cruel and unusual punishment); O'Neil v. 
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (cruel and unusual punishment; resolved on other grounds). 
56. Morrison, supra note 44, at 151. 
57. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). 
58. Id. at 370. 
59. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
60. Morrison, supra note 44, at 152. 
61. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (grand jury indictment, jury trial). Morrison 
points out that pro-incorporation statements made during the debates on the Fourteenth 
Amendment were raised by counsel during this case, challenging Black's assertion that the 
legislative history had never been considered. Morrison, supra note 44, at 154. See also 
supra, text accompanying note 47. 
62. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (self-incrimination). In Twining, Harlan 
dissented on the grounds that compelled self-incrimination violated both the privileges or 
immunities clause and the due process clause. 
I am of opinion that as immunity from self-incrimination was recognized in the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and placed beyond violation by any Federal 
agency, it should be deemed one of the immunities of citizens of the United States 
which the Fourteenth Amendment in express terms forbids any State from 
abridging-as much so, for instance, as the right of free speech .... 
It is my opinion also that the right to immunity from self-incrimination cannot 
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Notwithstanding the failure of the general incorporation doctrine to 
win Supreme Court approval, the idea that substantive due process might 
provide the rationale for enforcing the First Amendment guarantees against 
the states was beginning to capture some legal and scholarly imaginations. 
The radical International Workers of the World ("IWW") or Wobblies 
advanced that argument during the early years of the century when their 
legendary "free speech fights" provoked arrest and trial.63 That, in tum, 
evoked a backlash from the press itself. One editorial referred to "the 
arrogant assumption of the street orators that they were 'exercising a 
constitutional privilege' - a deliberate misinterpretation" of the First 
Amendment, which leaves the states the power "to abridge the right of free 
speech" as they see fit.64 
But one chronicler of the period, B.F. Moore, a staff member of the 
Commission on Industrial Relations, was not so sure. Writing in 1915, 
Moore noted that the Supreme Court had interpreted the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting state "infringement of 
property rights rather than personal rights" but indicated the possibility that 
the Amendment extended to guarantees of free speech and press as well. 
"[!]t is not positively known at present just what protection is given to 
certain personal rights by certain clauses of the U.S. Constitution, 
especially the 14th amendment.,,65 
Although the notion got no traction whatsoever in the Supreme Court, 
prominent scholars of the pre-World War I era, whom Mark Graber has 
called "the conservative libertarians,,,66 continued to move the idea forward 
even as they began to discard the laissez-faire economics supported by 
substantive due process. Thomas Cooley, for example, considered both 
freedom of speech and freedom of contract among the fundamental rights 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 
Theodore Schroeder and Ernst Freund, on the other hand, believed that 
speech rights were protected by the due process clause, but that freedom of 
contract stood on a different (and lesser) footing. 68 Henry Schofield 
be taken away by any State consistently with the clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that relates to the deprivation by the State of life or liberty without 
due process of law. 
Id. at 124-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
63. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOITEN YEARS 125 (1997). 
64. Id. (quoting A Plain Statement of the San Diego 'Free Speech' Fuss, S.D. EVE. 
TRIB. 4 (Mar. 13, 1912)). Such an editorial could be taken as evidence in itself that the press 
was not yet ready to act as an interest group with respect to First Amendment doctrine. 
65. Id. at 125. 
66. MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL 
LIBERTARIANISM 8 (1991). 
67. Id. 
68. See id. 
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maintained the view that First Amendment freedoms should apply to the 
states through the privileges or immunities clause.69 
Thus, on the eve of World War I, a growing body of scholarly 
literature favored enforcing the First Amendment guarantees against the 
states. And although the Supreme Court had effectively eliminated the 
privileges or immunities clause as a mechanism for such enforcement, the 
logic of substantive due process provided a promising alternative. It would 
be some years, though, before the issue again reached the Court; the 
earliest wartime cases dealt with violations of the new federal Espionage 
and Sedition Acts70 and thus raised no challenge to state law. 
In the first case that arguably raised the issue, Gilbert v. Minnesota,71 
the Court upheld a conviction under a state law against discouraging 
enlistments without "deciding or considering" it.72 In his dissenting opinion 
in Gilbert, Justice Brandeis also saw "no occasion to consider whether [the 
Minnesota law] violate[d] also the Fourteenth Amendment," but, in an 
obvious attack on substantive due process, said he could not believe that 
"the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty 
to acquire and to enjoy property.,,73 Two years later though, Justice 
Brandeis joined a majority opinion that asserted "neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the United 
States imposes upon the States any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' .. 
,,74 
In 1923, the Court struck down a state statute prohibiting the teaching 
of foreign languages in school on due process grounds, citing the 
acquisition of useful knowledge as a protected liberty interest.75 In 1925, 
the Court inched even closer to resolving the issue, assuming if not quite 
deciding, "that freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by 
the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress-are among the 
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.,,76 
The Court brushed off its 1922 dictum in Prudential and cryptically cited 
several authorities, only some of which tended to support its proposition.77 
69. RABBAN, supra note 63, at 209. 
70. See Schenck Y. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk Y. United States, 249 
U.S. 204 (1919); Debs Y. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams Y. United States, 250 
U.S. 616 (1919); Schaefer Y. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920). 
71. 254 U.S. 325 (1920). 
72. Id. at 332. 
73. Id. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
74. Prudential Ins. Co. Y. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922). 
75. Meyer Y. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
76. Gitlow Y. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
77. Id. Of all the cited cases, only Meyer actually struck down a state statute on due 
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Notwithstanding its now famous assumption in Gitlow v. New York, 
the Court affinned Gitlow's conviction under New York's criminal anarchy 
statute over the dissent of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, who also 
acknowledged the application of the Fourteenth Amendment.78 It may be 
that the Court made its assumption solely in order to acquire jurisdiction 
over the case and uphold the New York statute/9 but the Court never 
looked back on that question again. Two years later, in Whitney v. 
California,8o the Court upheld a similar statute that had been challenged on 
the same ground. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis wrote: 
[I]t is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. 
Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are 
protected by the federal Constitution from invasion by the states. The 
right of free speech, the ri~ht to teach and the right of assembly are, of 
course, fundamental rights. I 
In Fiske v. Kansas,82 also in 1927, the Court reversed a conviction 
under a similar Kansas statute for insufficient evidence, holding the 
particular application of the statute unconstitutional. 
Finally, in 1931, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting the 
display of an anarchist red flag. In Stromberg v. California, Chief Justice 
Hughes cited Gitlow, Whitney, and Fiske for the proposition "that the 
conception of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment embraces the right of free speech. ,,83 Incorporation was 
complete, creating the indispensable condition for Near v. Minnesota later 
that same tenn. 
III. COL. MCCORMICK TAKES CHARGE OF NEAR 
When Kirkland received the Near file from McConnick, his response 
was unequivocal: 
I think: the decision in this case is utterly at variance with all of our 
Institutions ... and most certainly establishes a dangerous precedent to a free 
press. Whether the articles are true or not, for a judge, without a jury, to 
process grounds. See 262 U.S. at 403. In another, Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 
(1907), the issue was explicitly left undecided. 
78. 268 U.S. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The general principle of free speech, it 
seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the 
scope that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there used, although perhaps it may be 
accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the 
sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States. "). 
79. ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON & HERMAN BELZ, 2 THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 518 (7th ed. 1991). 
80. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927). 
81. [d. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
82. 274 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1927). 
83. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931). 
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suppress a newspaper by writ of injunction is unthinkable, and is just another 
step, along with the Volstead Injunction, to do away with jury trials. The 
remedies of civil action and criminal action were open to the State's Attorney 
and if the Jewish race or the grand jury was slandered, criminal libel could be 
invoked. If this decision stands, any newspaper in Minnesota which starts a 
crusade against gambling, vice, or other evils may be closed down, all of 
which without a trial by jury. Of course, newspapers which are habitually 
slanderous and defamatory should not be allowed to run, but they should be 
stopped only in accordance with law. We should not have criminals running 
the streets at large, but they are, nevertheless, entitled to a jury trial.84 
Kirkland noted that the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") 
planned to carry the case up to the Supreme Court and expressed the hope 
that the decision would be reversed there. If not, Kirkland mused, it would 
be easy for a governor in Illinois or some other state to push a similar 
statute through the legislature. "I wonder if there is some way we could get 
in touch with the people appealing to see that their briefs are properly 
prepared," he mused.8s McCormick seemed to have something more in 
mind. 
McCormick was no stranger to hardball litigation. Early in his career, 
the Tribune had successfully defended a series of libel suits by Mayor 
William "Big Bill" Thompson in 1917 and 1918 seeking $1.3 million for 
criticizing Thompson's pro-German attitude during the war.86 The first 
major libel case that involved McCormick directly arose from an editorial 
that he did not write, but approved, in 1916, titled "Henry Ford is an 
Anarchist." The editorial took Ford to task for criticizing the Mexican 
"troubles" and threatening the jobs of any Ford worker who volunteered for 
service when the National Guard was called out.8? 
Weymouth Kirkland defended the Ford case; Philip Kinsley, who 
later wrote Liberty and the Press hailing the Tribune's role,88 covered for 
the Tribune. The trial was vicious, with Ford portraying McCormick as 
having a corrupt interest in the Mexican war, and McCormick making Ford 
out to be something close to a traitor.89 The trial went from mid-May to 
mid-August, with Ford ultimately winning six cents in damages. 
McCormick refused to pay, and Ford never collected.90 
By December 1920, the animosity between McCormick and 
Thompson had reached the breaking point. Thompson sued the Tribune 
84. Letter from Kirkland to McCormick (Sept. 14, 1928) (on file with Tribune 
Archives). 
85. [d. 
86. See FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 73. 
87. SMITH, supra note 6, at 175. 
88. See KINSLEY, supra note 6, at 28-34. 
89. See FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 70-73. 
90. [d. at 72. 
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(and the Daily News) for $10 million, claiming his administration had been 
libeled by exposes of municipal corruption. It was the largest libel action 
ever filed in the U.S. at that time.91 The suit was ultimately dismissed in 
October 1921: 
[W]ith a ringing affirmation ofa free press as 'the eyes and ears of the world . 
. . the advocate constantly pleading before the alter of public opinion. It holds 
up for review the acts of our officials and those men in high places who have 
it in their power to advance peace or endanger it. ,92 
McCormick had been named chairman of the American Newspaper 
Publishers Association ("ANP A") Committee on Freedom of the Press 
shortly after the association's 1928 annual meeting in April93 by ANPA 
President Edward H. Butler of the Buffalo Evening News.94 So, the day 
after Kirkland opined on the Near file, McCormick wrote his old friend 
Samuel Emory Thomason of the Tampa Morning Tribune and Chicago 
Journal and Daily Times. Thomason was a former law partner of 
McCormick's, one-time business manager of the Tribune, and a member of 
McCormick's committee.95 "I have written to the editors of several of the 
largest newspapers in the state of Minnesota and asked their opinion on 
[the case]," wrote McCormick who further stated: 
I have referred the records in the case to my own lawyer. It may be that we 
should intervene in the appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. If 
the freedom of the press is in jeopardy I don't think we should leave it to any 
outside organization to fight our battle.96 
Thomason readily agreed that the ANP A should intervene in the 
Minnesota case and offered to bring the matter up at a board of directors 
meeting in New York. "It might be a good idea if you would write a note to 
the Board and suggest, as chairman of the committee on the Freedom of the 
Press, that this step be taken, and then I'll follow it through.,,97 McCormick 
did write the directors on September 21, warning that "there is but little 
chance of there being a reversal of the case unless the ANP A or some other 
91. SMITH, supra note 6, at 241-44. 
92. Id. at 243 
93. AM. NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASS'N (ANPA), REpORT OF THE FORTY-SECOND 
ANNUAL MEETING 146 (1928) (cited in EDWIN EMERY, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS AsSOCIATION 222 at note 5 (1950». 
94. Letter from Lincoln B. Palmer ("Palmer"), ANPA General Manager, to McCormick 
(May 4, 1928), and reply (May 7, 1928). 
95. The committee also included Harry Chandler of the Los Angeles Times, William T. 
Dewart of The (Los Angeles) Sun, and James Kerney of the Trenton Times, according to an 
undated list of members (probably from 1928 or early 1929) in the Tribune Archives. 
96. Letter from McCormick to Samuel Emory Thomason ("Thomason") (Sept. 15, 
1928). 
97. Letter from Thomason to McCormick (Sept. 17, 1928) (on file with Tribune 
Archive). 
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similar pUblic-spirited association takes over the litigation.,,98 According to 
Friendly, however, their response was minimal. 
Nevertheless, when Judge Baldwin reconvened the trial court on 
October 10, Tribune lawyers William Symes and Charles Rathbun had 
joined Latimer at Near's table.99 As it happened, the additional firepower 
was useless. Following a largely perfunctory hearing, Olson asked Baldwin 
to issue a permanent injunction, and Baldwin told him to prepare the 
order. IOO Three months later, Baldwin signed the order for a permanent 
injunction: "Let said nuisance be abated."lol 
That final order set the stage for a new appeal to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, but it also seemed to embarrass the Minnesota legislature, 
and the Tribune's coverage shifted from the court battle to an effort to 
repeal the gag law. On February 27, 1929, the Tribune reported that State 
Representative R. R. Davis had introduced a bill in the House to repeal the 
law. 102 The article reported that the Tribune had criticized the gag law since 
it was first enacted but made no mention of any involvement in the 
litigation. In fact, it incorrectly reported that the "[American] Civil 
Liberties [U]nion has entered the fight and has taken the case of the 
Saturday Review to the United States Supreme [C]ourt in an effort to prove 
the law unconstitutional.,,103 
The role of the press generally remained tepid. "I have written to 
approximately ten publishers of leading newspapers and magazines in the 
United States," the Tribune quotes Davis. "The replies, which are 
beginning to come back to me, are almost unanimous for repeal of the 
law."I04 The Tribune, however, kept up the drumbeat. On March 5, it 
covered a speech Davis made before a House legislative committee 
condemning the gag law. Davis noted that, in addition to the Tribune, the 
St. Paul Pioneer Press, and Editor & Publisher had editorialized against 
the law. 105 
The Tribune continued its thorough coverage of the Minnesota 
hearings throughout March, at one point partially correcting the record 
regarding the pending litigation. "Now an appeal to the United States 
Supreme [C]ourt from this decision is being undertaken by the publisher of 
The Chicago Tribune. The American Civil Liberties league also has 
98. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 79. 
99. Id. at 79-80. 
100. Id. at 80-81. 
101. Id. at 81. 
102. Move to Repeal Minnesota Law Muzzling Press, CHI. TruB., Feb. 27,1929, at 14. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. (emphasis added). 
105. Solon Attacks Press Gag Law of Minnesota, CHI. TruB., Mar. 5, 1929, at 23. 
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interested itself in repeal of the law.,,106 The article also noted that the 
ANP A had taken the position that the Minnesota law "is a dangerous 
precedent to permit on court records in a nation which has prided itself on 
its freedom of press and speech.,,107 But most Minnesota editors, the article 
said, had "failed to take a serious interest in the law, contenting themselves 
with the idea that' decent newspapers will not be affected by the law. ",108 
The next day, the Tribune editorialized against the gag law under the 
headline "A Monkey State Candidate"-an unstated reference to the 
Scopes evolution trial in Tennessee.109 In the editorial, the Tribune formally 
announced that it "will challenge the law in behalf of the Saturday Press 
before the United States Supreme [C]Ourt."IIO That editorial, and others, 
were quoted extensively by Rep. Davis when the hearings continued on 
March 25. 111 Also testifying against the gag law then were S.M. Williams, 
editor of the St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch; Sam Haislett, secretary 
of the Minnesota Editorial Association; and Prof. Bruce McCoy of the 
University of Minnesota Journalism School. 112 
It was all to no avail, however, as the committee voted 11-3 to 
recommend postponing action on the repeal bill indefinitely, and the House 
adopted the committee report, 86-30. I \3 Opposition to the bill was led by 
Rep. C.A. Peterson, who said supporters of repeal suffered from 
"hallucinations" with regard to threats to freedom of the press. 114 "If you 
repeal this bill," Peterson said, "there is an army of persons waiting to 
begin publication of scandal sheets.,,115 The Tribune's editorial response 
was scathing and classic McCormick. In "Minnesota Joins the Monkey 
States," the Tribune declared: 
The defeat of the repeal bill is a disgrace to the state of Minnesota. 
When the law was enacted in 1925 it had attracted relatively little 
attention, and its passage could be interpreted charitably as an 
oversight. Today the significance of the law is plain and the refusal to 
repeal it indicates beyond all question that the enactment of the law 
was a deliberate attempt to strangle criticism in a way which 
enlightened men have rejected as unsound politically and morally for 
nearly 300 years. 
106. Hearing Today on Newspaper Gag Law Repeal Bill, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1929, at 
24. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Editorial, A Monkey State Candidate, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 19,1929, at 14. 
llO. Id. 
Ill. Newspaper 'Gag'Law is Assailed as 'Dangerous.' Cm. TRIB., Mar. 26,1929, at 17. 
ll2. Id. 
113. Bill to Repeal Press Gag Law is Set Aside, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1929, at 22. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
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Minnesota joins hands with Tennessee, and of the two Minnesota 
may justly claim to be the more ridiculous. After all, it is less than a 
hundred years since intelliyent men discarded the traditional biological 
notions found in the Bible. 16 
201 
The day that editorial appeared, the Tribune legal team submitted a 
voluminous 377 -page brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court surveying 
2,300 years of censorship, from Socrates to the present, mentioning such 
exemplary "critics of government" as Christ and Savonarola, Zenger and 
Vallandigham. 117 The brief was signed by Weymouth Kirkland, Louis 
Caldwell, Charles Rathbun, and Edward Caldwell of the Kirkland firm. The 
Latimers were listed as associate counsel. The brief argued that affirming 
the gag law 
would put a precedent on the books which hereafter would be used by 
an intrenched minority to escape ouster from office and opprobrium. 
It is unconstitutional to issue an injunction stifling a newspaper even 
after hearing and trial; to issue a temporary injunction before hearing 
and without any trial whatsoever is a despotic act which the American 
people always have thought could be characteristic only of a czar or 
the inquisition, and inconceivable in a democracy.118 
On this trip to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Near had not only the 
full attention of McCormick, his Tribune, and its law firm, but also, at long 
last, the organized support of the publishers. When L.B. Palmer asked 
McCormick on March 6 for a report of his Freedom of the Press Committee 
for the ANPA annual meeting,119 set for April 24, in New York City, 
McCormick had the law firm prepare a summary of the Minnesota case. 
Howard Ellis sent a draft to McCormick on March 19. Ellis summarized 
the case through May 25, 1928, when the Minnesota Supreme Court 
affirmed the restraining order and remanded the case: 
It was at this point that The Chicago Tribune became aware of the 
revolutionary effect of this decision upon the liberties of the people 
and of the press. By agreement with the defendants, the attorneys for 
the Chicago Tribune became additional council (sic) in the case with 
instructions to present, if possible, the illegality of the statute under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 120 
Ellis went on to discuss the trial and expressed the hope that, if the 
Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holding, "the Supreme 
Court of the United States can review the whole matter; and a sincere effort 
116. Editorial, Minnesota Joins the Monkey States, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1929, at 14. 
117. History of2,300 Years Cited in "Gag" Law Brief, CHI. TRlB., March 29, 1929, at 9. 
118. Jd., (quoting Petitioner's Brief in State ex reI. Olson v. Guilford, 228 N.W. 326 
(Minn. 1929». 
119. Letter from Palmer to McCormick (Mar. 6, 1929). 
120. Howard Ellis, Resume of the Case of State versus Guildford (Mar. 19, 1929) 
(transmitted to the Committee on Freedom of the Press of the American Newspaper 
Publishers Association). 
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will be made to obtain a review by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. ,,121 Under the heading, "Some Objections to the Statute," Ellis 
outlined the substantive case in detail, then appealing to the publishers 
through their wallets, considered "The Effect of the Statute on Newspaper 
Values:" 
Needless to say, if this statute is held valid, the value of newspaper 
properties throughout the country will be greatly diminished. If the law 
is valid in Minnesota it is valid in other states. There is always the 
possibility of similar legislation being adopted elsewhere. Newspapers 
can be suppressed at the will of the legislature and a single judge 
sirting without a jury and, if a preliminary injunction is granted, before 
notice to the newspaper or hearing. No legitimate business can stand 
up under such a load. No legitimate business has ever been subjected 
to such a burden . . .. 
The possibility that such a law could legally be adopted and enforced 
would cause newspaper properties everywhere to decline in value. 122 
The report seems to have had the desired effect. On the opening day 
of the ANP A convention, the publishers accepted the report that Ellis 
prepared for McCormick and adopted a resolution pledging a united front 
against the Minnesota law. 123 The following day, New York City's three 
leading dailies lent their editorial support to the fight. The World said the 
law was "the most extreme attempt to fetter journalism made anywhere in 
the country since civil war days," while the Herald-Tribune said the law 
"authorize [ s] capital punishment of a newspaper by the fiat of a single 
judge.,,124 The Times praised McCormick's "effective struggle against the 
statute" and said publishers who heard his committee report "were amazed 
that any state legislature in the Union could have passed such a law.,,125 A 
few days later, the Herald- Tribune editorial was reprinted in full in 
McCormick's Tribune as its "Editorial of the Day.,,126 
McCormick had also garnered the moral support of the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors ("ASNE"), which met in Washington on 
April 18 shortly before the ANPA convention in New York City. President 
Walter M. Harrison, editor of the Daily Oklahoman and the Oklahoma City 
Times, urged ASNE to "lend every assistance possible" to support 
McCormick's campaign to overturn the Minnesota statute. 127 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 6. 
123. Publishers Join in Fight on Law Muzzling Press, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 25, 1929, at 11. 
124. Minnesota Gag Law Target o/New York Press, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 26, 1929, at 16. 
125. Id. 
126. Editorial of the Day, Minnesota's Gag Law, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1929, at 14 
(reprinted from the New York Herald-Tribune). 
127. Press-Gag Statute Assailed by Editor, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1929, at 5. 
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No larger club could be held over the newspaper profession by the 
judiciary. Under such a tyrannical statute a corrupt judge might silence 
any fair comment about his derelictions and kill a newspaper by a 
temporary writ that would ruin a going business before the editor 
might have an opportunity to prove his case during his day in court. 128 
203 
Harrison praised McCormick effusively as "the fIrst to raise his 
voice" against what Harrison called "a medieval invasion of the freedom of 
the press guaranteed in our bill ofrights.,,129 McCormick was a member of 
ASNE as well as ANPA and served on ASNE's committee on legislation 
and freedom of the press, along with Edward S. Beck of his own Chicago 
Tribune and Samuel Williams and R. J. Dunlap of the St. Paul Pioneer 
Press and Dispatch. 130 Notwithstanding Harrison's call, there is no 
indication that ASNE ever contributed any money to the litigation 
campaign. 131 
Oral arguments before the Minnesota Supreme Court were scheduled 
for May 23, but were postponed until October 1, at Kirkland's request, then 
postponed again until December 2. When the court fInally heard the case, 
Friendly writes, the event "more resembled a procedural ceremony than a 
legitimate clash of arguments.,,132 Having found the gag law constitutional 
once, there was little chance the court would change its mind and nothing 
the Tribune's "dream team" did seemed to have any contrary influence. 
Near's frustration boiled over, and on December 14, even before the 
Supreme Court decision came down, he wrote a truly grotesque letter to 
McCormick, complaining about Ellis's handling of the case, including 
delays since the spring and his attraction to "Minnesota moonshine.,,133 
This case means everything to me. It is I who am deprived of a chance to 
make a living, of my property. True, I am defying court orders and inviting 
a jail sentence for writing for the Beacon, but I have got to live and Mr. 
McCormick, ifI'm going to be made an ass of by Mr. Ellis and the laughing 
stock of the city because of his actions while here - I'm not and I don't 
b I· 134 e leve you expect me to. 
In all likelihood, nothing Ellis could have done would have affected 
the outcome of the case. As expected, the Minnesota Supreme Court once 
again upheld the gag law in a perfunctory opinion. "The record presents the 
same questions upon which we have already passed .... Upon authority [of 
the earlier opinion], wherein our views have been more fully expressed, the 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. PRATIE, supra note 4, at 28. 
13l. Id. (pratte says the committee "provided mostly rhetoric in the fight for freedom 
and against censorship.") 
132. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 83-84. 
133. Letter from Jay M. Near ("Near") to McCormick (Dec. 14,1929). 
134. Id. 
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judgment herein is affirmed.,,135 But the decision touched off a flurry of 
activity from McCormick and Kirkland to enlist support from the 
publishers to take the case to the United States Supreme Court.136 
A draft letter from McCormick to Harry Chandler, president of the 
Los Angeles Times, dated December 23, 1929, served as the model. 137 "The 
question now arises, - shall the case be taken to the United States Supreme 
Court? It may be taken on three grounds, - violation of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution, violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution, and violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution 
of Minnesota. ,,138 
McCormick then reiterated the appeal Ellis had made to the 
publishers' financial interests and offered the best- and worst-case 
scenarios: 
It is obvious that if we appeal the case and win it, such cloud as has been 
placed upon our titles will have been removed. The chances appear to be very 
much in favor of our winning the case, but in the event of our failure to win 
the case, I imagine we might expect the legislatures of the various States to 
enact similar legislations, which then would be probably held up by the 
Supreme Courts of most, if not all, the States. Free press in this country 
would disappear. 
The other alternative is to wait quietly and trust that the Minnesota 
case with the Minnesota statute will not be copied in other 
jurisdictions, or if it is copied in other States and upheld by the other 
Supreme Courts, then take the fight to Washington. I think it is obvious 
that the Supreme Court of the United States would be less likely to 
reverse two or more States (sic) Supreme Courts than to reverse one. 139 
Finally, McCormick made a plea for solidarity among the publishers, 
presumably more for symbolic than financial purposes. 
This matter is of vital interest to all of us. I do not feel that I should 
definitely take action which will be binding upon all the newspapers of 
the country. I am writing this letter to all the members of the 
Committee on the Freedom of the Press, soliciting their views. It may 
be that they will be sufficiently unanimous and positive to enable us 
without a further meeting to make a recommendation to the Directors. 
If not, I will endeavor to obtain a meeting of the Committee, as time 
135. State ex reI. Olson v. Guilford, 228 N.W. 326, 326 (Minn. 1929). 
136. Indeed, the Tribune's coverage of the adverse decision carried the subhead, 
"Publishers Will Appeal to U.S. Tribunal," although the story was rather more modest. "It is 
expected sponsors of the action will take the case to the United States Supreme [C]ourt, as 
opponents of the law contend it is a violation of the right of freedom of speech." Court 
Upholds Newspaper Gag Statute Again, CHI. TRIB. Dec. 21, 1929, at 7. 
137. Letter from McCormick to Harry Chandler ("Chandler") (Dec. 23, 1929) (on file 
with author). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
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will not permit our awaiting the annual Convention without losing our 
right of appeal. 
Will you think this matter over. and when you have done so, write 
me what you think should be done?140 
205 
McCormick sent this draft to Kirkland, who suggested a change in the 
paragraph that involved grounds for taking the case to the United States 
Supreme Court.141 McCormick changed the letter the same day and sent it 
off via teletype to Chandler. The paragraph now read: "It may be taken on 
two grounds. Does the statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution or does it violate the Free Speech Amendment to 
the Constitution of Minnesota, which is virtually the same as the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution?,,142 
Kirkland also advised McCormick that, after a long talk with Ellis, he 
and Ellis were both "quite confident . . . that the Supreme Court of the 
United States will not uphold this statute.,,143 But he warned that waiting to 
see if other states might enact similar legislation could have a negative 
influence on the High COurt. l44 
McCormick added Kirkland's observations to the committee letter 
and, on December 26, asked his secretary, Genevieve Burke, to remove any 
remarks specific to Chandler and prepare the letter for all committee 
members and ANP A President Butler. 145 The letters went out on December 
27.146 
Butler wrote back on December 30, 1929, agreeing with 
McCormick's proposal to take the matter to the United States Supreme 
Court "along the grounds outlined in your letter.,,147 But Butler said he did 
not think he had authority, as ANPA president, to "direct this action 
without the consent of the Board.,,148 Butler asked McCormick to send him 
copies of the responses he received from the committee members, "and I, 
in turn, will immediately take a mail vote on the proposition from the 
members of the Board in order that this matter will not be delayed unduly, 
for, as you say, there is danger in delay.,,149 Dewart also wrote back on 
140. Id. 
141. Letter from Kirkland to McCormick (Dec. 24, 1929) (punctuation added). 
142. Letter from McCormick to Chandler (Dec. 24, 1929). It is not clear why Kirkland 
thought the United States Supreme Court would hear a chal\enge to the statute on the 
ground that it violated the state constitution. The state supreme court would have been the 
ultimate authority on that point. 
143. Id. 
144. Letter from Kirkland to McCormick, supra note 141. 
145. Telegram from McCormick to G.L. Burke (Dec. 26, 1929). 
146. Id. (pencil annotation on the telegram). 
147. Letter from Edward Butler ("Butler") to McCormick (Dec. 30, 1929). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
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December 30, recommending the case be taken up on state constitutional 
grounds. ISO Thomason agreed. 
Because I can not imagine that the United States Supreme Court would 
sustain the opinion of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and because I 
think it is wise to get this matter settled while we know that the 
preparation of the briefs and arguments is in the hands of capable 
lawyers, I am for taking the case to the United States Supreme Court 
lSI 
now. 
Chandler's response was dated January 1, 1930,152 and he counseled 
wait[ing] a little before proceeding ... and see[ing] in the interval if 
any disposition manifests itself on the part of other states to enact 
similar legislation. 
I have heard of none and I should say the chances are somewhat 
against any considerable movement in this direction. In many, in fact 
most states, I am inclined to believe that the combined influence of the 
newspapers would prevent such enactments, if attempted. 
The policy is frankly that of letting sleeping dogs lie. If we go to the 
Supreme Court now and that tribunal upholds the Minnesota court, we 
will have stirred up the matter to a point strongly conducive to similar 
legislation in other states. If so formidable a movement develops as to 
make it necessary ultimately to go before the Supreme Court, I do not 
believe we will be any worse off than we are now. I note the objection 
of Mr. Kirkland to this delay. While I am not a lawyer, it seems to me 
likely that if the Supreme Court should knock out the Minnesota 
statute because of its faulty wording, as Mr. Kirkland suggests, this 
would not prevent another state from drawing a similar law but 
avoiding the errors made in Minnesota. 
This is merely an offhand opinion. The matter is certainly worthy of 
h b ·d· . . 153 t e very est cons I eratlon we can give It. 
There is a pencil annotation on Thomason's letter, "send copy of each 
to each," and a follow-up letter to each member dated January 16, 1929, 
confirms that the Dewart, Thomason, and Chandler letters were sent to 
each of them. 154 In that follow-up letter, McCormick noted that he had also 
received many newspaper clippings and found them to be "practically 
unanimous" in their strong opposition to the Minnesota decision. I 55 
150. Letter from William T. Dewart ("Dewart") to McCormick (Dec. 30, 1929). On 
March 7, 1930, Dewart would write McCormick to say he had read that the United States 
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case on state constitutional grounds. "I should 
assume from this that the fight might better be based on the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, 1 am not a Constitutional lawyer." 
151. Letter from Thomason to McCormick (Jan. 2, 1930). 
152. Letter from Chandler to McCormick (Jan. 1, 1930). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Letters from McCormick to Dewart, Thomason and Chandler (Jan. 16, 1930). 
McCormick had some of these published in the Tribune. Under the heading "Editorial of the 
Day," he published editorials critical of the gag law from the New York Herald-Tribune, The 
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It seems to me desirable that we take the appeal at this time both 
because we will lose our rights if we delay and because this is the most 
advantageous way in which to mobilize the press of the country in 
defense of its rights. 
Acting in unison, I strongly believe we can defend this essential 
principle of our form of government. Without united action I am afraid 
that we will be destroyed piecemeal, and with us the Republican form 
of government. 156 
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On January 18, McCormick wrote Butler suggesting that the ANPA 
Board of Directors recommend taking the case to the Supreme Court and 
asking for approval of the entire membership by mail ballot: 
In this way, I think you will put practically every newspaper in America 
actively behind our movement. At the same time you will have aroused the 
newspapers of the country to such an extent that wherever similar legislation 
is proposed the newspapers of the state will be ready to organize against it. 15? 
James Kerney finally responded on January 21. "On the whole, while 
there is some force in Mr. Chandler's arguments, I agree with you that the 
considerations on the other side of the question are much more important, 
and that an immediate appeal should be taken to the United States Supreme 
COurt.,,158 
McCormick then turned his attention to Near's frustration. He sent 
some of Near's correspondence to Kirkland on January 23, including a 
letter asking for money to expand and promote a new Saturday Press. 159 "I 
take it that this Johnny is trying to shake us down," McCormick told 
Kirkland. 160 "I think you draw the right conclusion," replied Kirkland. 161 
"You will remember that some time last fall I told you we had a request 
from him for money which you very properly refused to grant. Ellis 
transmitted this information to him and since then he has had no use for 
Ellis. ,,162 
Minnesota Gag Law, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1930, at 10, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, The 
Minnesota Injunction Law, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1930, at 12. Other clips in McCormick's file 
included two identical AP photos of himself, with the caption, "Col. Robert McCormick, 
publisher of the Chicago Tribune, as head of a committee of American newspaper 
publishers is leading a fight to nullify the Minnesota newspaper 'gag' law," from the Everett 
(Wash.) Herald, Jan. 17, 1930, and the Pocatello (Id.) Tribune, Jan. 18, 1930. The trade 
journal, Editor & Publisher, The Fourth Estate, had also sent McCormick a "rough early 
proof" of an article for its Jan. 18, 1930, issue entitled Will Take 'Gag' Law To Supreme 
Court/Col. McCormick, As A.N.P.A. Committee Head, Will Be Leader in Fight to Prove 
Illegality of Minnesota Law. 
156. Letter from McCormick to Dewart, Thomason and Chandler, supra note 155. 
157. Letter from McCormick to Butler, Jan. 18,1930. 
158. Letter from James Kerney ("Kerney") to McCormick (Jan. 21, 1930). 
159. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 86-87. 
160. Letter from McCormick to Kirkland (Jan. 23,1930). 
161. Letter from Kirkland to McCormick (Jan. 27,1930). 
162. Id. 
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Kirkland asked to see McCormick as soon as possible-McCormick 
was wintering in FloridaI63-"because I am under the impression that 
whether we take up the case or not, Near will have someone do it and with 
his lack of means it will probably be very poorly briefed."I64 Later, 
Kirkland condemned the Minnesota gag law in a speech to the Legal 
Club.165 
Meanwhile, McCormick's efforts to enlist the support of the other 
publishers was having mixed results, receiving praise for his efforts but no 
financial backing. 166 The ANPA board met on February 8, 1930, and, 
according to Lincoln Palmer, was "in full accord with Colonel 
McCormick's suggestion that [taking the case to the Supreme Court] was 
the proper course to follow.,,167 In a letter to Thomason, however, Palmer 
pointed out that the association had been "under unusually heavy expense 
during the past year.,,168 
In view of these heavy expenses already incurred the Board naturally 
hesitates to incur additional heavy expense, and so I have been asked 
to write to you to express the hope of the Board that you will discuss 
the matter with Colonel McCormick who is, I understand, in Florida at 
this time, with a view toward learning in what manner the expense of 
. h' hr hi' b 169 carrying t IS case t oug to a conc uSlon may e met. 
Thomason forwarded Palmer's letter to McCormick, along with his 
own summary of the Board's position. 
They did not feel that they had any right to ask you to bear the expense 
of the Freedom of the Press case any further, but they assigned to me 
the delicate task of saying to you that the Association would be glad to 
cooperate in every way if the Tribune would bear the legal burden. 170 
McCormick was more interested in polling the ANP A membership 
than in any financial contribution, telling his secretary to inform committee 
members he would be glad to bear the expense if a substantial majority 
163. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 86. 
164. Letter from Kirkland to McCormick, supra note 150. 
165. Arthur Evans, Press Gag Law Called Blow at Basic Liberties, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 
1930, at 5. 
166. Typical was a Jan. 23, 1930, letter from M.V. Atwood, secretary of the New York 
State Society of Newspaper Editors, who wrote McCormick to express his organization's 
appreciation for 
the brave and unselfish fight you are making of the freedom of the press in the 
matter of the Minnesota gag law. Because of the precedent it sets, this law is a 
menace to every newspaper in the United States and the editors of New York are 
indeed grateful that it is to be carried to the highest court by so fearless and 
distinguished a protector of free speech and the freedom of the press as yourself. 
Letter from M.V. Atwood to McCormick (Jan. 23, 1930). 
167. Letter from Palmer to Thomason (Feb. 11,1930). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Letter from Thomason to McCormick (Feb. 14, 1930). 
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favored the appeal. l7I He wired Thomason especially to explain that the 
poll would "have the effect of thoroughly arousing the membership which 
is just as important as the appeal itself."172 He asked Thomason whether he 
thought he could get the idea adopted, and Thomason wired back to say he 
would try and believed he could succeed.173 
The next day, McCormick wrote Thomason that he had instructed 
Kirkland to "perfect the appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.,,174 He also provided a longer, more detailed explanation of his 
overall strategy. 
It seems to me highly desirable that the members of the A.N.P.A. 
should be polled as to their favoring this procedure. In this manner we 
will arouse them to the peril of the situation as we cannot in any other 
way, and will have them prepared to resist any injunction laws 
proposed in other States or in Washington. Unless we do arouse the 
Publishers in time, I am afraid that the politicians will begin knocking 
them off State by State until they have shown they can get away with it 
and then will pass injunction laws throughout the Union. 
It is to be borne in mind that the Courts were never favorable to the 
Freedom of the Press. The press attained its freedom by legislative 
action. On the other hand, our Supreme Court is more favorable to 
Constitutional rights than it was when Taft was Chief Justice, and may 
be more favorable now than it will be when some of the present 
Judges, notably Brandeis and Holmes, have passed on. 
I hope the Board of Directors will act before the next meeting of the 
Association in New York. 175 
Thomason wrote back to tell McCormick that he had written to Butler 
to ask for an immediate poll, but that Butler had gone south for the winter. 
So he wired Palmer asking for a telegraphic vote of the directors 
authorizing the referendum. "I think you are entirely right in your 
conclusion," he told McCormick, "and I will keep after Palmer and the 
directors with a view to getting a referendum before the New York 
meetings. ,,176 
Having received assurances from Kirkland that there was time to 
conduct the referendum before the right of appeal expired,177 Palmer sent 
McCormick a draft of the referendum letter. The letter hailed McCormick 
as an "ardent champion" of freedom of the press, "so seriously challenged" 
171. Letter from McCormick to Burke (Feb. 17, 1930). 
172. Telegram from McCormick to Thomason (Feb. 17, 1930). 
173. Telegram from Thomason to McCormick (Feb. 17,1930). 
174. Letter from McCormick to Thomason (Feb. 18, 1930). 
175. Id. 
176. Letter from Thomason to McCormick (Feb. 1930) (date obscured). 
177. Telegram from Palmer to McCormick (Feb. 20, 1930), with reply telegram from 
Kirkland to Palmer (Feb. 22, 1930). 
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by the Minnesota law. The letter said McCormick had retained counsel and 
perfected an appeal in the case and 
is prepared to continue this fight through to a United States Supreme 
Court decision to the end that newspapers may be protected from 
suppression by injunction, provided the membership is in accord with 
such action. A referendum vote has been ordered by President Butler 
and you are requested to record your vote.178 
McCormick found the letter "entirely satisfactory.,,179 
In March, McCormick stepped up the campaign to bring the 
publishers on board in anticipation of the ANP A annual convention the 
following month. He wrote to M.V. Atwood, secretary of the New York 
State Society of Newspaper Editors, asking him to "suggest to the members 
of your State Association that they vote in the affirmative" on the 
referendum. 180 He also reported the ANPA referendum in the Tribune, 
summarizing the case "[ f]or the information of editors and other readers 
who have not had the [case] brought to their attention.,,181 And he wired 
Palmer suggesting the press be given results of the referendum on a weekly 
basis, mailed out as "news matter," not merely put in the ANPA Bulletin as 
Palmer had suggested.182 At the time, the vote was 275-5 in favor of the 
appeal. 183 
McCormick was very eager for the annual convention, as well as for a 
meeting of his Freedom of the Press committee. Palmer wrote McCormick, 
noting the difficulty in scheduling a meeting the previous year and asking 
whether he wanted one this year. 184 "Of course we will have a meeting .. 
. ," McCormick replied. "As far as I am concerned, I will put it ahead of any 
other meeting.,,185 McCormick also asked Palmer for fifteen minutes "to 
put my views before the convention. I don't care when.,,186 Palmer wrote 
back to say he had arranged for McCormick to address the convention 
during the first session and had scheduled a meeting of the committee. 187 
He also told McCormick that the poll stood at 331-6 in favor of 
intervention. 
178. Letter from Palmer to McCormick (Feb. 25, 1930). 
179. Telegram from McCormick to Palmer (Feb. 28,1930). 
180. Letter from McCormick to M.V. Atwood (Mar. 10, 1930). supra note 155. 
181. The Minnesota Gag Law, Cm. TRm., Mar. 11,1930, at 14. 
182. Telegrams from McCormick to Palmer (Mar. 14, 1930); Palmer to McCormick 
(Mar. 15, 1930); McCormick to Palmer (Mar. 15, 1930). Letters from Palmer to McCormick 
(Mar. 17, 1930); McCormick to Palmer (Mar. 19,1930). 
183. Letter from Palmer to McCormick (Mar. 17, 1930). 
184. Letter from Palmer to McCormick (Mar. 18, 1930). 
185. Letter from McCormick to Palmer (Mar. 20, 1930). 
186. Letter from McCormick to Palmer (Mar. 21,1930). 
187. Letter from Palmer to McCormick (Apr. 2, 1930). 
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That eagerness, however, did not extend to preparing a committee 
report. Palmer had asked for a report by April 10 so that it could be 
published in the preconvention Bulletin. He told McCormick the report 
would be of "outstanding interest to our Convention.,,188 McCormick 
replied that he couldn't make a report "until the vote of the members is in 
and until the Board of Directors has taken some action upon our 
recommendation." He suggested Palmer "might phrase a report of the 
situation to date" and he would "be glad to sign it.,,189 
Before receiving McCormick's response, Palmer again asked for the 
report in another letter. 19o Noting that their correspondence was crossing, 
McCormick repeated his unwillingness to submit a report, this time telling 
Palmer that the editorial assistant he had assigned to collect material for the 
report had left the Tribune. "I believe you could write a report on this one 
subject, the Minnesota case, which we could submit to our committee .... 
Next year I will have somebody on [t]he Tribune compile a comprehensive 
report on the subject for the following meeting." 191 
Palmer sent a draft report to McCormick's secretary on April 11, 
suggesting that she forward one copy to Kirkland. l92 The report, which was 
to be signed by the committee members, found "no attempts to abridge 
[freedom of the press] by state or federal legislation, and . . . few attempts 
on the part of the COurtS.,,193 One of those attempts involved an Ohio court 
that sentenced two editors to thirty days and $500 in fines for publishing 
editorials criticizing a judge for sitting on a trial in a case in which the 
judge had an interest. 194 The convictions were overturned on appeal to the 
Ohio Appeals COurt,195 and Palmer quoted from the opinion of Judge Willis 
Vickery: 
We live in an age of pitiless pUblicity! We live in an age when freedom 
of speech and freedom of press are paramount issues. People should be 
allowed to say what they please, and newspapers to print what they 
please, always makin~ themselves liable under the laws of slander or 
the laws of libel .... I 6 
188. Letter from Palmer to McCormick (Mar. 20, 1930). 
189. Letter from McCormick to Palmer (Mar. 22, 1930). 
190. Letter from Palmer to McCormick (Mar. 22, 1930). 
191. Letter from McCormick to Palmer (Mar. 24, 1930). 
192. Letter from Palmer to Burke (Apr. II, 1930) (including draft Report of Committee 
on the Freedom of the Press). 
193. Id. (quoting Report of Committee on the Freedom of the Press). 
194. Seltzer v. State ex Read, 1930 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1116 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. March 
6, 1930). For a description of the original contempt order, see Press v. Bench, TIME, Jui. 19, 
1929. 
195. 1930 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1116. 
196. Id. at 20. 
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In other words, it is better that the press be free, that speech be free .. 
[and] that the right to air our views be free, than it is that they be 
uttered in fear and trembling .... 
A free people must have a free press and they must have the right to 
speak freely their thoughts. 197 
Palmer also reported on the Minnesota case referendum, which now 
stood at 375-8. "The Chicago Tribune's attorneys, therefore, are perfecting 
the appeal to the United States Supreme Court, and your Committee feels 
that there is every indication of a successful termination of the issue 
involved. ,,198 
McCormick forwarded the draft to all of the members of the 
committee. 199 Kerney sent back a lengthy letter, thanking McCormick and 
congratulating him on his vigilance. "It is fine and I am proud to have my 
name signed to it, although I have contributed nothing. You are doing a 
great job. ,,200 
As I see it, the biggest danger to American institutions comes from the 
arrogance of the courts, which undertake to assume all the functions of 
the three departments of government. Perhaps a large part of the blame 
rests with the press, which has been too indulgent, or too timid, in 
pointing out the infringement on liberty by stupid judges.201 
Kerney added that the quotation from Judge Vickery "should be 
pasted in the hat of every editor and every judge in America. ,,202 Dewart 
wrote the same day, "It suits me.,,203 
Meanwhile, a formal resolution had been drafted for adoption by the 
ANP A convention. McCormick sent a copy to Kirkland, and Ellis 
suggested revised language: 
Be it resolved that Chapter 285, Session Laws of 1925 of the State of 
Minnesota, popularly known as the 'Gag Law', (sic) is a violation of 
the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, a peril to the right of property and a menace to republican 
institutions; 
Be it further resolved that this association condemn this statute as a 
dangerous and vicious invasion of personal liberties; 
Be it further resolved that this association and its members cooperate 
to cause its annullment (sic) and to prevent the enactment of similar 
1 ·1· 204 egIs attOn. 
197. Id at 24. 
198. See Letter from Palmer to Burke, supra note 192. 
199. Letters from McCormick to Dewart, Kerney, Thomason, and Chandler (Apr. 14, 
1930). 
200. Letter from Kerney to McCormick (Apr. 16, 1930). 
201. Id 
202. Id 
203. Letter from Dewart to McCormick (Apr. 16, 1930). 
204. Telegram from Ellis to McCormick (Apr. 18, 1930). 
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The 1930 ANPA convention saw Harry Chandler replace Edward 
Butler as president and also, apparently, experience a change of heart 
regarding the financing. Chandler had written to McCormick back in 
March suggesting the membership "share expenses pro rata with [t]he 
Chicago Tribune. ,,205 On April 19, the ANP A directors actually voted to 
"meet the cost incurred in connection with taking an appeal. ,,206 Chandler 
had told the directors immediately after the convention that he would 
communicate with McCormick to get some idea of the costs involved, but 
illness prevented Chandler from following through until late May. "If you 
have any approximate idea of what the appeal cost will be I should like to 
have it in order to make Mr. Palmer's records as complete as possible," 
Chandler wrote.207 
McCormick asked Kirkland to "kindly supply the important and 
interesting information" that Chandler had requested?08 Kirkland estimated 
the total cost, including oral argument, at $25,000?09 McCormick 
forwarded the information to Chandler, adding, "[a]ny sum that the 
AN.P.A sees fit to pay will be satisfactory to me.,,210 In the end, ANPA 
contributed $5,000 to the appeal.211 
Meanwhile, Kirkland's legal team had been working on a brief for the 
Supreme Court. McCormick monitored the process closely and freely 
offered his advice. At one point, for example, he advised Kirkland that 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis was "a fairly orthodox Jew, and it may not be 
wise to greatly emphasize the crucifixion in the appeal .... ,,2\2 Later, he 
advised Kirkland, "I think we should point out that the Government in 
Washington is the outcome of a fight for free government of which 
freedom of the press was an integral part.,,213 That advice came in a cover 
letter for a document McCormick entitled "Comments on the Minnesota 
Brief," which contained sixteen suggestions for changes in the draft: 
1. I have never read JUNIUS. I understand it was very bitter and was 
anonymous. Can't you argue that if anonymous publications are forced 
by law, they will be much more bitter and defamatory than established 
publications? .... 
205. Letter from Chandler to McCormick (Mar. 20, 1930). 
206. Letter from Chandler to McCormick (May 21, 1930) (quoting a letter from Palmer 
to Chandler without noting its date). 
207. Letter from Chandler to McCormick (May 21, 1930). 
208. Letter from McCormick to Kirkland (May 16, 1930). Kirkland noted the Tribune 
had already paid $3,615.42 in the appellate process and incurred another $949.21 still 
unpaid. He estimated the cost of printing the record and briefs at $2,500. [d. 
209. Letter from Kirkland to McCormick (June 20, 1930). 
210. Letter from McCormick to Chandler (June 25, 1930). 
211. SMITH, supra note 6, at 282. 
212. Letter from McCormick to Kirkland (May 12,1930). 
213. Letter from McCormick to Kirkland (May 26, 1930). 
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3. Page 55: It seems as though it might be more convincing to 
present an instance or two of the prosecutions instituted after the 
expiration of licensing: were they not against political opponents rather 
than against scandalous, lewd, or malicious publications? .... 
5. Page 74: It appears you might profitably continue the quotation 
from Madison where he shows how the executive, judiciary and 
legislature are curtailed by the first amendment. 
6. Page 87: Might we comment that the Minnesota statute does not 
give the defendant even such protection as the sedition act was 
supposed to afford through a jury and therefore is much worse than this 
greatly reprobated statute? .... 
10. Page 175: Of course the decision that the jury and not the judge 
should decide the libelous nature of a writing is a precedent against 
letting a iudge make the decision through the expedient of an 
.. . 214 lDJUDctIon. 
McCormick's suggestions continued in letter after letter to Kirkland. 
"I wonder if the old laws against scolds are in any way relevant to the 
injunction case," he wrote in one.215 Kirkland assured McCormick that 
"most of your ideas can and will be incorporated in the brief," but 
cautioned that, "while the brief in the Supreme Court of Minnesota was 377 
pages in length, the brief in the Supreme Court of the United States cannot 
be permitted to run over 75 pages." Pointing out that the Court had 
"recently dismissed several briefs merely on account of the length," 
Kirkland told McCormick that "[ s ]uch of your suggestions that cannot be 
incorporated in the brief can undoubtedly be worked into oral argument.,,216 
That admonition seemed to have little or no effect on McCormick. 
"Would the best way to fix the court's mind upon the essential issue be - to 
start off with a quotation of the First amendment to the Constitution?" he 
asked in another letter, which he drafted at least twice.217 In that letter, he 
urged Kirkland to use an extended quotation from Richard Brinsley 
Sheridan on the power of the press to overcome even the most corrupt 
government that is now carved in the entry hall of the Tribune building in 
Chicago.218 
214. Robert R. McConnick, Comments on the Minnesota Brief, May 27,1930. 
215. Letter from McCormick to Kirkland (May 28, 1930). 
216. Letter from Kirkland to McCormick (May 29, 1930). 
217. Letter from McCormick to Kirkland (June 5,1930 and June 11, 1930). 
218. "Give me but the liberty of the press and I will give to the minister a venal House of 
Peers. I will give him a corrupt and servile House of Commons. I will give him the full 
swing of the patronage of office. I will give him the whole host of ministerial influence. I 
will give him all the power that place can confer upon him to purchase up submission and 
overawe resistance: and yet, armed with the liberty of the press, I will go forth to meet him 
undismayed. I will attack the mighty fabric of that mightier engine. 
I will shake down from its height corruption and bury it beneath the ruins of the abuses it 
was meant to shelter." Id 
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McCormick's attention during the summer of 1930 was necessarily 
focused on the murder of Tribune crime reporter Jake Lingle and revelation 
of Lingle's all-too-close relationship with the Capone gang.219 Still, 
McCormick and the Tribune remained active in the Near case and other 
press freedom issues.220 Among the more interesting issues to surface that 
summer was the fifteen percent annual tax on newspaper advertising 
proposed by Louisiana Gov. Huey P. Long, which would later become the 
central issue in another landmark Supreme Court decision, Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., Inc. 221 McCormick had received a letter from Philip 
Schuyler of Publishers' Service Semi-Monthly in New York "wondering" 
what his committee was going to do about the tax.222 McCormick said the 
committee had "asked all the newspapers of America to oppose the 
newspaper tax bill in Louisiana" and had been advised by the Item-Tribune 
in New Orleans "that the opposition is proving effective.,,223 
By the fall of 1930, the Near case was back in the news as the gag 
law's initial sponsor, Minnesota State Sen. George Lommen, announced 
that he would support repeal in the Minnesota legislature.224 Soon 
thereafter, Floyd B. Olson, the former district attorney who had filed for the 
injunction against Near's Saturday Press, was elected governor of 
Minnesota and, in his inaugural address in January 1931, expressed support 
for the repeal. Olson explained that, although he remained convinced of the 
statute's constitutionality, he now believed "that the possibilities for abuse 
make it an unwise law," a position he could not take as prosecutor.225 The 
Tribune's editorial in support of repeal fell far short of embracing Olson, 
claiming credit instead for having initiated the court challenge?26 The St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch was more charitable toward Olson, and the Tribune 
duly carried its editorial the following day.227 
219. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 6, at 291-299; LLOYD WENDT, CHICAGO TRIBUNE: THE 
RISE OF A GREAT NEWSPAPER 529-538 (1979); JOSEPH GIES, THE COLONEL OF CHICAGO 86-
100 (1979). 
220. By this time, McCormick had been asked to chair the freedom of the press 
committees for ASNE as well as ANP A, finally receiving ANP A Board permission to do 
both in October 1930. Letter from McCormick to Chandler (May 22, 1930): Letter from 
Palmer to McCormick (June 5, 1930): Letter from McCormick to Chandler (June 10, 1930): 
Letter from Palmer to McCormick (Oct. 15, 1930). 
221. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
222. Letter from Philip Schuyler ("Schuyler") to McCormick (June 21, 1930). 
223. Letter from McCormick to Schuyler (June 25,1930). 
224. Minnesota Starts Movement to Repeal Newspaper Gag Law, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 
1930, at 7. 
225. Gov. F.B. Olson Asks Repeal of News 'Gag Law, ' CHI. TRIB., Jan. 9, 1931, at 5. 
226. Editorial, The Minnesota Gag Law, Chi. Trib., Jan. 14, 1931, at 14. 
227. Editorial of the Day, Minnesota Has a Governor [St. Louis Post-Dispatch], CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 15, 1931, at 14. 
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Bills to repeal the gag law were introduced in both the Minnesota 
House and Senate on January 15228 and approved by the House on February 
4 by a vote of 68-58 after two days of intense debate.229 Perhaps 
anticipating the demise of the gag law one way or the other,230 one 
Minnesota state senator began drafting a draconian new criminal libel law 
that provided prison tenus of one to three years?31 But prospects for the 
legislation's clearing the Senate had begun to dim,232 and, at one point, its 
chief sponsor, Sen. Lommen, agreed to allow the bill to lie dormant in 
committee pending a "speedy" decision by the United States Supreme 
COurt.233 In the end, the bill died in the crush of other legislative business 
when sponsors failed to win a special order giving it priority 
consideration.234 
But the machinations of the Minnesota legislature had no effect on the 
legal process through which Near v. Minnesota finally reached the United 
States Supreme Court. Near's jurisdictional statement had reached the 
Court on May 17, 1930,235 and the Court had noted probable jurisdiction on 
October 20?36 Kirkland filed Near's brief on December 12,237 and 
Minnesota Attorney General Henry N. Benson filed the state's reply brief 
on January 19, 1931.238 Oral arguments were scheduled for January 30. 
IV. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
After describing the statute as interpreted and applied by the 
Minnesota courts, Kirkland's seventy-page brief defined "freedom of the 
press" as broader than Supreme Court "precedents passing upon that right 
under the First Amendment.,,239 Rather, Kirkland asserted that precedents 
defining the right under state constitutions and the common law are also 
apposite?40 Averring that all such authorities, from Blackstone to the 
228. Bill to Repeal Minnesota Gag Law is Offered, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1931, at 26. 
229. Minnesota "Gag" Law Repeal is Voted in House, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 1931, at 6; 
Committee May Kill Minnesota Gag Law Repeal, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1931, at 9. 
230. See Editorial of the Day, Press "Gag" Law Doomed [Niagara Falls Gazette}, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 24, 1931, at 10. 
231. Severer Libel Law Considered/or Minnesota, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 1931, at 14. 
232. See Committee May Kill Minnesota Gag Law Repeal, supra note 229, at 9. 
233. Bill to Repeal 'Gag'Law Will Await Decision, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27,1931, at 12. 
234. Senate Blocks Minnesota Gag Law Repealer, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1931, at 21. 
235. Supreme Court Gets "Gag" Law Plea from Near, CHI. TRIB., May 18, 1930, at 7. 
236. See Minnesota Gag on Press Goes to High Court, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 1930, at 16. 
237. Press Gag Law is Attacked in Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1930, at 6; 
Appellant's Brief, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
238. Minnesota Gag Law De/ended in u.s. Court Brief, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 1931, at 6; 
Brief of Appellee, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
239. Appellant's Briefat 21, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
240. Id. 
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present, agree with the proposition that freedom of the press prohibits prior 
restraints,241 Kirkland proceeded to offer the court a veritable library of 
precedents supporting that position.242 He acknowledged a handful of cases 
where an injunction had been granted affecting freedom of speech or of the 
press but distinguished the lot as aimed at preventing unlawful conduct and 
having only an incidental effect on the right of free speech and press?43 
Having established that the statute violated freedom of the press, 
Kirkland next set out to show that freedom of the press is protected by both 
the due process and privileges or immunities clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.244 For the former proposition, Kirkland pointed to Gitlow v. 
New York45 and subsequent cases; by 1930, that issue had been all but 
conclusively decided/46 and Kirkland's case was strong and focused. 
Precedents for the latter proposition were more general, with only a 
tenuous link to freedom of the press; the Slaughter-House Casei47 had 
gutted the privileges or immunities clause, and Kirkland could not resurrect 
it here?48 No matter, he concluded; freedom of the press "is probably a 
right of such magnitude that it would exist even in the absence of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. ,,249 
Minnesota's brief began by limiting the issue to the due process 
clause, which the state conceded arguendo might protect Near's liberty 
interest in freedom of the press (although not without a skeptical 
footnote)?50 But that freedom, the brief asserted, "does not include the free 
and unrestricted right to publish obscene, scandalous or defamatory 
matter.,,25I Minnesota relied heavily on the World War I Espionage and 
Sedition Act cases for the proposition that freedom of speech is not 
absolute, then concentrated on showing that the injunction against Near 
was a valid exercise of the state's police power to abate a real nuisance, not 
an injunction against mere libel as Kirkland had characterized it.252 
There is no transcript of the oral argument, but Friendly reconstructs 
it from newspaper accounts.253 "The words were delivered by counsel," 
241. Id. at 22. 
242. Id. 
243. /d. at 45-46. 
244. Id. at 46. 
245. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
246. See supra Part II. 
247. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
248. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
249. Appellant's Brief at 65, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
250. Brief of Appellee at 8, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
251. [d. 
252. !d. 
253. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 125-133 and accompanying note at 202. 
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Friendly says, "but the rhetoric was vintage McCormick.,,254 Kirkland 
spoke for fifty-four minutes, interrupted by Justice Pierce Butler's 
reminders that "the Saturday Press was a hate sheet which regularly 
published defamatory articles ... ,,255 Butler asked "ifit wasn't 'fanciful' to 
prevent a state such as Minnesota from enforcing a decree to prevent 
further publication of malicious articles.,,256 Friendly reports Kirkland 
responding that "the proper remedy for persons feeling themselves defamed 
was to seek indictments and criminal trials before juries . . . . The 
Minnesota gag law [was] a remedy worse than the evil it attempted to cure. 
,,257 
Deputy Attorney General James E. Markham argued for the state that 
the statute did not violate the federal Constitution "because it provided for 
due process of law as commanded by the Fourteenth Amendment.,,258 Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes interrupted to steer Markham away from any 
Fourteenth Amendment argument, citing Gillow to establish conclusively 
that freedom of the press is a fundamental right. He then asked Markham to 
address the prior restraint question. Markham denied that the injunction 
amounted to a prior restraint, calling it a "punishment for an earlier 
wrong. ,,259 He also defended the statute as "beneficial to newspapers 
because it would 'have the effect of purifying the press. ",260 
Both Friendly'S account and the Tribune's coverage emphasize the 
questioning of Justice Louis D. Brandeis. It is evident from Brandeis's own 
papers that he had been preparing for this case for some time. One note to a 
clerk, H. Thomas Austern, dated October 14, 1930, for example, says "let 
me know as early as possible" whether the case has been discussed in any 
newspapers, trade magazines, or law reviews.261 Two days later, Brandeis 
asked Austern to check the house organs and annual reports of the ANP A 
and ASNE for anything they might have said about the case.262 Other notes 
showed that Austern tracked coverage of the case in Editor & Publisher, 
Printers Ink, the Minneapolis Journal, and the Minnesota Law Review, 
among others.263 
254. Id. at 126. 
255. Id. at 128. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 129 (internal citations omitted). 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Note from Justice Louis D. Brandeis [hereinafter Brandeis] to HTA (presumably 
law clerk H. Thomas Austern) (Oct. 14, 1930) in the Brandeis papers at the Library of 
Congress. 
262. Note from Brandeis to HTA (Oct. 16, 1930). 
263. Id. 
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Brandeis's papers also contain handwritten and typed copies of a 
Minneapolis Journal editorial supporting the gag law and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's second affirmation of it?64 Some segments of the press 
had supported the law, and Minneapolis Journal editors had even helped 
draft it.265 Brandeis also collected clips from the Washington Post and the 
newspaper Labor on efforts to repeal the gag law.266 
At oral argument, Brandeis told Markham that it was "difficult to see 
how one is to have a free press and the protection it affords a democratic 
community without the privilege this act seems to limit.,,267 He led 
Markham like an experienced cross-examiner to admit that the kind of 
collusion between gangsters and public officials reported in the Saturday 
Press was "privileged" as '''a matter of prime interest to every American 
citizen. ",268 When Markham replied, '" [a ]ssuming it to be true, '" Brandeis 
"snapped back: 'No. A newspaper cannot always wait until it gets the 
judgment of a court. ",269 
According to Friendly, Markham looked to Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., to rescue him from Brandeis's embrace, noting Holmes's 
majority opinion in Patterson v. Colorado,270 which upheld a contempt 
charge against a newspaper publisher. Friendly quotes Holmes as replying, 
"I was much younger when I wrote that opinion than I am now, Mr. 
Markham. If! did make such a holding, I now have a different view.,,271 
Near, at least, reacted favorably to the oral arguments. On February 4, 
1931, he wrote to McCormick expressing the view that the case seemed to 
be won but also complaining that, for him, the victory would be a Pyrrhic 
one because he was jobless and broke.272 Near had been working off and on 
for a paper called the Beacon and, in April 1930, was acquitted of criminal 
libel charges stemming from his reporting there.273 Now, he wanted 
McCormick to "underwrite the Saturday Press for a few months" and help 
Near turn it into a "national publication with wide influence and certain 
financial success.,,274 McCormick apparently ignored him. 
264. Editorial, Suppression Act Again Upheld, MINN. J., Dec. 21, 1929, at 6. 
265. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 2l. 
266. Editorial, Minnesota's Press Gag, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1931, at 6; Expect Repeal 
of Newspaper 'Gag' Act in Minnesota, LABOR, Jan. 27, 1931. 
267. Brandeis Hints Minnesota's Gag Law is Invalid, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31,1931, §1, at 7. 
268. Id. 
269. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 130-31. 
270. 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
271. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 132 (internal citations omitted). 
272. Letter from Near to McCormick (Feb. 4, 1931). 
273. Libel Acquittal Adds Interest to Gag Law Case, CHI. TRIB., May 8, 1930, at 3. 
274. Letter from Near to McCormick (Feb. 4, 1931). 
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It is far from clear, however, why Near was so confident that the case 
would be won. From the oral arguments, he could be reasonably certain of 
support from Justices Brandeis and Holmes and probably Harlan Fiske 
Stone. He could also be sure that Justice Butler would vote the other way, 
and probably carry the other three conservatives: Willis Van Devanter, 
James McReynolds, and George Sutherland-who came to be known as the 
"four horsemen.,,275 The other votes, however, were not so easily predicted. 
Less than a year earlier, on March 8, 1930, then-Chief Justice (and 
former president) William Howard Taft (who had resigned a month earlier) 
and Associate Justice Edward T. Sanford died within five hours of each 
other. Had they not left the Court when they did, Near v. Minnesota might 
well have gone the other way.276 As it was, the new appointees, Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Owen J. Roberts, were no sure bets, but 
both were more liberal than the men they replaced, and Roberts would 
eventually provide ''the switch in time that saved nine"-putting an end to 
President Roosevelt's so-called "court-packing" scheme.277 
Taft had led a solid six-vote conservative bloc consisting of Butler, 
Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Sanford. The dissenters were 
typically Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone.278 With a few personnel changes, 
this was essentially the ultra-conservative Court that ruthlessly enforced 
sedition laws against WWI dissenters and would go on to block 
Roosevelt's New Deal reforms. 
Hughes had been nearing the end of his second term as governor of 
New York in 1910 when then-President Taft offered him a seat on the 
Supreme Court upon the death of Justice David J. Brewer.279 Hughes 
accepted and served as associate justice until 1916, when he accepted the 
Republican nomination for the presidency.28o While on the bench, Hughes 
earned a reputation as a great liberal, supporting (usually in dissent) the use 
of state police powers to protect the public health and welfare against the 
conservative juggernaut that was substantive due process and liberty of 
contract, and use of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause to 
protect blacks and aliens insofar as the times permitted.281 
Hughes lost the election of 1916 to Woodrow Wilson282 and practiced 
law-including waging a campaign in support of five Socialists who had 
275. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 105. 
276. Smith points out that McCormick himself admitted that he would have lost if Taft 
had still been on the bench. SMITH, supra note 6, at 284. 
277. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 119. 
278. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 94. 
279. I MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 268 (1951). 
280. Id. at 329. 
281. SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 23-35 (1951). 
282. PUSEY, supra note 278, at 361. 
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been expelled from the New York State Assembly283-until becoming 
Secretary of State in the new Harding administration of 1921. He resigned 
from the Cabinet in 1925 and returned to the practice of law, also serving 
on international tribunals from 1926 to 1930?84 When Taft retired as Chief 
Justice because of ill health, President Hoover immediately nominated 
Hughes to succeed him.285 Despite his liberal record on the Court, Hughes 
was vigorously opposed by Senate progressives and populists, but in the 
end, Hoover's allies prevailed 52_26.286 Hughes assumed the office of 
Chief Justice on February 24, 1930, and retained the position until his 
retirement in 1941.287 
Roberts had been a successful corporate lawyer and taught at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School. He had not been very active 
politically, although he had served the government in the Teapot Dome 
cases, and his views were not very well known. He was not, in fact, 
Hoover's first choice to succeed Sanford. But Judge John J. Parker, whose 
name was first submitted, was rejected by the Senate for his having voted 
to uphold "yellow dog" contracts while a U.S. Circuit Court judge.288 
Roberts joined the Court in June 1930, and the Near v. Minnesota Court 
was complete. 
V. THE DECISION 
The decision was announced on June 1, 1931, with Hughes, Roberts, 
Holmes (who would retire the following year), Brandeis, and Stone in the 
majority, and the "four horsemen"-Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and 
V an Devanter-in dissent. 
Hughes began his opinion with an unadorned description of the state 
nuisance statute under which Near was enjoined and which, by the end of 
the opinion, Hughes would declare unconstitutional.289 Hughes quoted 
directly from the first section of the act, which provides for the abatement 
of "obscene, lewd and lascivious" or "malicious, scandalous and 
283. HENDEL, supra note 280, at 72-73; PUSEY, supra note 260, at 391-93. 
284. HENDEL, supra note 281, at 68-77. 
285. Id. at 78. As usual, Friendly tells a far more colorful story of the selection of 
Hughes to succeed Taft. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 101-03. 
286. HENDEL, supra note 281, at 78-88. See also TREVOR PARRY-GILES, THE CHARACTER 
OF JUSTICE 50-55 (2006). 
287. HENDEL, supra note 281, at 91. 
288. Id. at 90-91. See also Trevor Parry-Giles, Property Rights, Human Rights and 
American Jurisprudence: The Rejection of John J. Parker's Nomination to the Supreme 
Court, 60 S. COMM. J. 57 (\994). Parry-Giles points out that Parker's rejection grew out of 
the tension between property rights and human rights championed by conservatives and 
progressives, respectively, in the Senate and "represented an ideological moment of 
profound importance for those struggling with the onset ofthe Depression." Id. at 60-61. 
289. Nearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701-03 (1931). 
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defamatory" pUblications and establishes the defense of "truth . . . 
published with good motives and for justifiable ends.,,290 He paraphrased 
the second and third sections, which outline the act's enforcement 
procedures and the penalty for violation of not more than $1,000 or one 
year in the county jai1.291 
Hughes next began a chronology of the case against Near with a 
description of the complaint and its principal allegations.292 His recitation 
was remarkably dry, considering that it encompassed a number of very 
colorful articles, which are extensively quoted in the dissenting opinion. 
Drier still were the procedural details that followed, even though the route 
from temporary injunction to final appeal included two trips to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, which twice affmned the statute's 
constitutionality. Nothing in the early paragraphs of the opinion betrayed 
the direction Hughes's opinion would take, unless it was the absence of any 
reaction whatsoever to Near's outrageous brand of journalism. 
Quite the contrary, Hughes all but ignored the Saturday Press as he 
proceeded to take aim at the Minnesota nuisance act. Calling it "unusual, if 
not unique," Hughes found that it raised questions of "grave importance" 
that transcended local concerns.293 Awkwardly, with a pair of double 
negatives, he reminded the reader that liberty of the press is safeguarded 
against infringement by state laws and that state police powers are limited. 
Noting that liberty of the press is also limited and that states can punish 
abuses, Hughes finally revealed his analytical direction: "[T]he inquiry is 
as to the historic conception of the liberty of the press and whether the 
statute under review violates the essential attributes of that liberty.,,294 
Hughes seemed to digress from his historical course to consider 
assertions from both parties that Near's constitutional challenge was facial, 
that is, focused on the statute itself, not on its application to the Saturday 
Press. Hughes ignores the fact that this was a peculiar stance for an 
aggrieved party-though a rational strategic choice where the goal is to 
shape doctrine-and agreed that the Court's proper concern went beyond 
any errors of the trial court to the "purpose and effect" of the statute as 
construed by the state's highest court.295 Accordingly, he launched into a 
four-part description of purpose and effect that reads more like an 
indictment. 
290. Id. at 709-10. 
291. Id. at 703. 
292. Id. at 702-07. 
293. Id. at 706. 
294. Id. at 708. 
295. Id. at 708-09. 
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First, Hughes wrote, the statute does not redress private wrongs but 
aims to protect public welfare.296 Second, the statute targets not merely 
private libels but also publication of "charges against public officers of 
corruption, malfeasance in office, or serious neglect of duty.,,297 Third, the 
object of the statute is not punishment, but suppression.298 And fourth, the 
statute operates not only to suppress the offending newspaper, but "to put 
the publisher under an effect of censorship.,,299 The words of the statute 
evoke, not "the historic conception of the liberty of the press," Hughes 
wrote, but the very conditions that liberty was supposed to ameliorate.30o 
"If we cut through mere details of procedure,,,30I Hughes concluded, 
public authorities may bring a publisher before a judge for exposing their 
own dereliction and, unless the publisher proves truth published with good 
motives and justifiable ends, the newspaper is suppressed and further 
pUblication is punishable as contempt. "This is the essence of 
censorship. ,,302 
Then, as abruptly as he digressed, Hughes returned to the historical 
inquiry with Blackstone's classic definition: "The liberty of the press is 
indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no 
previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for 
criminal matter when published.,,303 Quoting Madison and citing an 1825 
Massachusetts case, he asserted that the historical immunity from previous 
restraints applies to legislative as well as executive action, and to false 
statements as well as true.304 
Acknowledging that Blackstone had been criticized, Hughes pointed 
out that the critics have not objected to the prohibition on previous 
restraints but on the presumption that liberty of the press stands for that and 
nothing more. Defending both civil and criminal libel laws, Hughes 
brought the analysis back to Jay Near: "For whatever wrong the appellant 
has committed or may commit, by his publications, the state appropriately 
affords both public and private redress by its libellaws.,,305 
Other critics, Hughes noted, believe the prohibition on previous 
restraints has been stated too broadly.306 Hughes agreed, excluding certain 
296. Id. at 709. 
297. Id. at 710. 
298. Id. at 711. 
299. Id. at 712. 
300. Id. at 708. 
301. !d. at 713. 
302. Id. at 712-13. 
303. Id. at 713-14. 
304. Id. at 714. 
305. Id. at 714-15. 
306. Id. at 715. 
224 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
wartime speech, obscenity, incitement, and speech acts from its purview.307 
But "these limitations are not applicable here," Hughes continued.308 To the 
contrary, "[t]he exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong light 
the general conception that liberty of the press, historically considered and 
taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not 
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.,,309 
Hughes reinforced the message with additional quotations from 
Madison and the Massachusetts case, this time emphasizing the value of 
prior restraints in stifling criticism of public officials.3\O The conviction that 
such restraints would violate constitutional rights, he said, is evinced by the 
almost complete absence of any attempts to restrain "publications relating 
to the malfeasance of public officers" in 150 years.3II Even where 
honorable officers are recklessly assaulted, subsequent punishment is the 
"appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege.,,312 
Turning finally to Minnesota's arguments, Hughes rejected the state's 
assertion that the statute dealt not with pUblications per se but rather with 
the business of publishing defamation. "Characterizing the publication as a 
business, and the business as a nuisance," he wrote, "does not permit an 
invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint. ,,313 Nor is that 
immunity lost, he continued, when the alleged official malfeasance would 
be punishable as crimes.314 
Hughes found the defense of truth, "published with good motives and 
for justifiable ends," inadequate to justify the Minnesota statute.315 Finding 
such a law constitutionally valid would be to recognize "the authority of 
the censor against which the constitutional barrier was erected.,,316 Equally 
unavailing is the state's insistence that the statute was designed to preserve 
I 
the public peace, he wrote, citing an early condemnation of what would 
come to be called the "heckler's veto" by a New Jersey court.317 "If the 
township may prevent the circulation of a newspaper for no reason other 
than that some of its inhabitants may violently disagree with it ... there is 
no limit to what may be prohibited," that court had opined.318 
307. Id. at 715-16. 
308. Id. at 716. 
309. Id. at 715-16. 
310. Id.at717. 
311. Id.at718. 
312. Id. at 716-20. 
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318. Id. at 721-22 (internal quotations omitted). 
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For all of these reasons, Hughes concluded, the Minnesota statute 
infringed the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.319 
Writing for the four dissenting justices, Associate Justice Pierce 
Butler accused the majority of giving press freedom "a meaning and a 
scope not heretofore recognized . . . . ,,320 Conceding that the Court had 
previously interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to protect press freedom 
from abridgment by the states, Butler asserted that the Near decision 
imposed an unprecedented restriction on the states.321 
In contrast to Hughes and both litigants, Butler insisted that the record 
required the Court to consider the statute, not facially, but as applied to 
Near's "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" articles.322 And, in contrast 
to Hughes's restrained description of the Saturday Press, Butler reprinted 
its virulently anti-Semitic articles verbatim, presumably to facilitate the as-
applied analysis.323 
After retracing the procedural history of the case against Near, Butler 
began his analysis with the assertion that the statute at issue was enacted as 
an exercise of the state's police power, that is, for the preserving of the 
peace and good order. "The publications themselves disclose the need and 
propriety of the legislation," he wrote, relating some of the unsavory 
history of Near and Guilford and their criminal journalism.324 States must 
be free to "employ all just and appropriate measures" to prevent such 
abuses, Butler insisted.325 
Butler quoted Justice Joseph Story's famous treatise on the 
Constitution for the proposition that the First Amendment is not absolute.326 
Such a supposition, Story had said, is "too wild to be indulged by any 
rational man.,,327 Butler rebutted Hughes's reliance on Blackstone by 
arguing that the previous restraints against which Blackstone railed were 
those that "subjected the press to the arbitrary will of an administrative 
319. Id. at 722-23. 
320. Id. at 723 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
321. Id. at 723-24. 
322. Id. at 724. 
323. See id. at 724 n.l. 
324. Id. at 731. 
325. Id. at 732. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES 
AND STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 635 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 
1994». 
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officer," not a judge acting pursuant to duly enacted legislation as the 
M · ·d 328 mnesota statute provl es. 
Asserting that the existing libel laws were "inadequate effectively to 
suppress evils resulting from the kind of business" in which Near engaged, 
Butler concluded that the doctrine against previous restraints, if imposed in 
cases like Near's, would 
expose the peace and good order of every community and the business 
and private affairs of every individual to the constant and protracted 
false and malicious assaults of any insolvent publisher who may have 
purpose and sufficient capacity to contrive and put into effect a scheme 
fi . bl Ian·l . 329 or program or oppresSIOn, ac al or extortIOn. 
VI. THE AFTERMATH 
By a single vote, Butler's limited view of freedom of the press was 
relegated to an historical footnote, and the principle that prior restraints are 
anathema to the Constitution has been a bulwark of the legal system ever 
since. McCormick was jubilant: 
The decision of Chief Justice Hughes will go down in history as one of 
the greatest triumphs of free thought. The Minnesota gag law was 
passed by a crooked legislature to protect criminals in office and 
supported by a state court as feeble in public spirit as it was weak in 
legal acumen. 
We must not blind ourselves to the fact that subversive forces have 
gone far in this country when such a statute could be passed by any 
legislature and upheld by any court, and must be on guard against 
further encroachments. 
The newspapers of America will realize the responsibilities 
devolving upon them under this decision and will maintain and 
increase the high principles which have guided them since the 
. . f fr 330 mceptlOn 0 a ee press. 
The June 2 Tribune carried a full banner headline, DECISION ENDS 
GAG ON PRESS, with a full column on the front page and nearly two full 
pages inside.33 ) The story included the full text of the opinion and dissent, 
the full text of ANPA's resolution, and an individual photograph of every 
Supreme Court justice.332 Favorable reaction was reported from Minnesota 
Govenor Floyd B. 0lson333 and the National Editorial Association, meeting 
328. /d. at 733-34. 
329. [d. at 737-38. 
330. Decision a Triumph for Free Thought, M'Cormick [sic] Says, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 
1931, § 1, at 7. 
331. Arthur Sears Henning, Minnesota Act Quashed by us. Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., 
June 2, 1931, § 1, at 1. 
332. [d. 
333. Governor Pleased by Decision Killing Minnesota Gag Law, CHI. TRlB., June 2, 
1931, § 1, at 7. 
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in convention in Atlanta.334 And, of course, McCormick's statement was 
run in full, although modestly positioned between the Olson and NEA 
reaction stories.335 
Coverage continued on June 3 with the favorable reaction of various 
members of Congress,336 an analysis of the recent "liberalization" of the 
Supreme Court by Washington correspondent Arthur Sears Henning,337 and 
an editorial expressing the hope that the decision would "arrest, if it does 
not end, the efforts to cripple the guarantee of a free press .... ,,338 More 
editorials followed. 339 
So did the congratulatory messages. Dewart wired McCormick the 
day after the decision came down: "Congratulations on the decision of the 
Supreme Court upholding your contention that the freedom of the press is 
not a political plaything. Since you did all the work, you deserve all the 
credit.,,340 To Seattle Times publisher Col. C.B. Blethen, who had also sent 
a congratulatory wire on June 2, McCormick wrote: "As a five to four 
decision, we just squeezed through. If Taft were still occupying Hughes' 
place, we would have been beaten.,,341 
Perhaps the most important message came from ACLU president 
Roger Baldwin. The ACLU had been an early supporter of the Near 
litigation and, shortly before the decision came down, circulated a 
pamphlet declaring: "Scandal and Defamation! The Right of Newspapers to 
DefamelUnique Minnesota law empowers judges to suppress papers by 
injunction/First such use of judicial power in American history/Chicago 
Tribune takes the case to the u.S. Supreme Court, where it awaits 
decision.,,342 Baldwin sent the pamphlet "To the Editor" with a cover letter 
urging editors to comment on the case and ''the larger issues of freedom of 
speech and of the press on which the American Civil Liberties Union bases 
its activity.,,343 
334. Editors Hail Gag Ruling as Press Victory, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 1931, § 1 at 7. 
335. Triumph for Free Thought, supra note 330, at 7. 
336. Press Gag Decision Praised by Washington Officialdom, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1931, § 
1, at 4. 
337. Arthur Sears Henning, Supreme Court 'Liberalized' in Recent Months, CHI. TRIB., 
June 3,1931, § 1, at 4. 
338. Editorial, The Background of the Gag Law, CHI. TRIB., June 3,1931, § 1, at 14. 
339. See Editorial of the Day, Another Liberal Victory [St. Louis Star}, CHI. TRIB., June 
4,1931, § 1, at 14; Editorial, Freedom of the Press, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1931, § 1, at 14. 
340. Telegram from Dewart to McConnick (June 2, 1931). 
341. Letter from McConnick to C.B. Blethen (June 1931) (date obscured). 
342. This pamphlet was in the McConnick archives. 
343. Letter from Roger Baldwin [hereinafter Baldwin] "To the Editor" (April 4, 1931). 
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Now Baldwin reminded McCormick of ACLU's early role in the case 
and expressed "delight[] with the outcome in the Supreme Court, even by 
so narrow a margin. ,,344 
On behalf of our entire Board, our liveliest appreciation of the service 
you have rendered the cause of a 'free press' in this country by thus 
backing the appeal. It was a victory by a dangerously narrow margin, 
but, I have no doubt, a victory that is decisive against the abuse of the 
injunctive process.345 
McCormick wrote back thanking Baldwin for the letter and 
condemning the Minnesota legislation as "merely another step in the 
demolition of private rights ... ,,346 
If the press had not acted when it did and with substantial unanimity, I 
am afraid the law would have been enacted in one State after the other 
and would probably have been held Constitutional first by the State 
Supreme Courts and afterwards when the law seemed so well 
established, by the United States Supreme Court. 
Let us hope that the Supreme Court decision in this case marks the 
turning of the tide.347 
Perhaps McCormick's worst fears were exaggerated, but Near v. 
Minnesota still stands as one of the great landmarks of First Amendment 
law to this day. Few people--journalists or lawyers-are aware of the vital 
role that Col. Robert R. McCormick played in shaping the prior restraint 
doctrine established by that opinion. And fewer still realize that he was 
instrumental in mobilizing the mainstream press to litigate, not only in their 
narrow commercial interests, but also in pursuit of their most fundamental 
rights to gather and publish the news. 
344. Letter from Baldwin to McCormick (June 4, 1931). 
345. Id. 
346. Letter from McCormick to Baldwin (June 6, 1931). 
347. Id. 
